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NOTES
HEY YOU, GET OFF [OF] MY CLOUD: AN
ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN SUIT PRECLUSIONS
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Leonard 0. Townsend
"[O1n June 22, 1969, Ohio's Cuyahoga River ignited in
a conflagration fed by oil and other industrial wastes.
When the rivers are on fire, you know things are bad."
Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act
After 25 Years, 27 ENVTL L. REP. 10574, 10576 (1997).
INTRODUCTION
Growing up as a child of the Sixties, I remember an
article that was so shocking to me that its content re-
mains a vivid memory to this day. Life magazine did a
photographic essay on Lake Erie, one of the five Great
Lakes, and reported that Erie's water was so polluted
that it resembled pea soup. The illustration, as I recall,
showed a beautiful sailboat attempting to sail through
the muck that was once water.
* J.D. Candidate 2001, Fordham University School of Law Eve-
ning Division. Licensed Architect, States of New York and New Jer-
sey. Senior Symposium Editor, Fordham Environmental Law
Journal 1999-2000. The author dedicates this Note to his two
beautiful children, Etienne, 16, and Jacques, 8. Furthermore, the
author would like to express his sincere thanks to Marsha Moss for
her patience and loving support during the preparation of this
writing.
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Congress enacted the Clean Water Act ("CWA")I in
1972, with the objective of "[r]estoratlon and mainte-
nance of chemical, physical and biological integrity of
[the] Nation's waters."2 The CWA states that this goal
will be met "through control of both point-3 [i.e. "wastes
delivered through pipes"] and nonpoint 4 [i.e. "wastes de-
livered via runoff"] sources of pollution"5 in the Nation's
waters. 6
1. "This Act [enacting this chapter] may be cited as the 'Federal
Water Pollution Control Act' (commonly referred to as the Clean
Water Act)." 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972) (amended 1977, renumbered
1987) (comment in original).
2. Id.
3. Point sources are typically pipes: "[flamiliar sources of point-
source pollution include industrial outflow pipes from factories,
and pipes discharging wastewater effluent from sewage treatment
plants." Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act
After 25 Years, 27 ENvTL L. REP. 10574, 10575 (1997).
The term 'point source' means any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fis-
sure container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feed-
ing operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term
does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and
return flows from irrigated agriculture. 33 U.S.C. §
1362(14) (1972) (amended 1996).
For an excellent investigation into the true nature of a 'point
source'; specifically the question of whether a person can be a point
source, see United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d
643 (2d Cir. 1993).
4. Nonpoint sources may typically be polluted runoff: "[siources
of polluted runoff include agricultural fields, urban pavement, and
suburban lawns- any surface from which rainwater or snowmelt
can carry disturbed soil or other pollutants that collect on a sur-
face (such as pesticides, excess application of fertilizer, or oil that
has dripped onto pavement) into water bodies." Caputo, supra note
3, at 10569.
5. "The term 'pollution' means the man-made or man-induced
alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological in-
tegrity of water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19).
"The term 'pollutant' means dredged soil, solid waste, incin-
erator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemi-
cal wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and in-
1999] CLEAN WATER ACT 77
The CWA addresses what private citizens can do,
should the federal or state administrators not act
against the violator; the "Citizen Suit" provision allows
private citizens 7 to initiate proceedings against a
dustrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water."
Id. at § 1362(6).
6. The statute refers to waters as "navigable waters." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (7)(1996). In fact, the term "navigable" is, statutorarily
speaking, a misnomer, because the test of whether waters are pro-
tected under the Clean Water Act does not consider whether they
are "navigable" or not. While the Army Corp of Engineers initially
interpreted the [CWA] as extending federal jurisdiction only to wa-
ters actually, potentially, or historically navigable, an interpretation
that covered few wetland areas, this interpretation was deemed too
restrictive. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Calloway,
392 F. Supp. 685 (D. D.C. 1975). The court held that Congress
had intended to extend federal regulatory authority to the limit of
its Commerce Clause powers, which would cover areas such as
wetlands as well. See id. See also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 977 (2d ed.
1996).
7. "For the purposes of this section the term 'citizen' means a
person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (g) (1972). Of course, the issue of the
citizen-plaintiffs standing (the plaintiffs ability to invoke court ju-
risdiction) Is invariably raised: "the standing question Is whether
the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal court juris-
diction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his
behalf (citation omitted). The constitutional requirements for
standing, injury in fact, causation, and redressability were clearly
summarized in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United,
454 U.S. 464... (1982)." Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Universal
Tool & Stamping Co.,, 735 F. Supp. 1404, 1410 (D. Ind. 1990).
Universal Tool further illustrates the entities who potentially may
sue as citizen-plaintiffs: "[tIhis broad category of potential plaintiffs
necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce [CWAI stat-
utes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are 'noneconomic'
and probably noncompensatable [i.e. injuries to environmental,
recreational or aesthetic interests], and persons like (the plaintiff in
this case] who assert that they have suffered tangible economic
injuries because of statutory violations." Id. at 1409. The court
went on to say that "plaintiffs may sue so long as they can demon-
strate an 'identifiable trifle' constituting actual or threatened In-
jury, because such harm Is sufficient to guarantee that plaintiffs
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violator8 or against the Administrator 9 if the Adminis-
trator falls to perform his statutory duties. The provi-
sion for citizen suits is not unique to the CWA; it is
found in various forms within many statutes having en-
vironmental significance.10
The main focus of this Note will be to illustrate and
comment upon how the various circuit courts have In-
terpreted the plain meaning limitations to citizen suits
as found in the CWA. "When an authoritative written
text of the law has been adopted, the particular lan-
guage of the text is always the starting point on any
question concerning the application of the law.""1 How-
ever, this task is not as simple as it might seem at first
blush:
Unlike mathematical symbols, the phrasing of a
document, especially a complicated enactment, sel-
dom attains more than approximate precision. If In-
dividual words are inexact symbols, with shifting
have a concrete interest In the outcome of the litigation." Id. at
1412, citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14
(1973).
8. "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section ['No-
tice'], any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf (1)
against any person (including (I) the United States, and (it) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent per-
mitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is al-
leged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation un-
der this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation." 33 U.S.C. §
1365 (a) (1972) (amended 1987).
9. "[Any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf
(2) against the Administrator where there is an alleged failure
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary with the Administrator." Id.
10. See, e.g., The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1990) ("Citi-
zen suits"); The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1984) ("Citizen suits"); The Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1992) ("Citizen's civil actions"); and
The Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1984) ("Citizen
suits").
11. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
45.01, at 1 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992) (1891).
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variables, their configuration can hardly achieve in-
variant meaning or assured definiteness .... A stat-
ute is an instrument of government partaking of its
practical purposes but also of its infirmities and its
limitations, of its awkward and groping efforts.' 2
With this in mind, Part I of this Note considers the
various courts scrutiny of words in the statute, specifi-
cally referring to what circumstances may preclude or
limit an otherwise properly filed citizen suit under the
CWA. Part II focuses on two sets of seemingly opposite
holdings by different circuits. Part III of this Note con-
tains an in-depth analysis and observation of statutory
interpretation geared toward determination of whether a
specific citizen suit should be precluded under the stat-
ute. Finally, Part IV of this Note concentrates on an ex-
ploration of doctrinal provisions that come into play
should a citizen suit be allowed.
I. STATUTORY UNDERPINNINGS
The CWA proceeds by stating that pollutants may not
be discharged'- except according to the conditions set in
12. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Stat-
utes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 529 (1947), quoted in SUTHERLAND,
supra note 11, at 32.
13. "[lIt is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollut-
ants in toxic amounts be prohibited." 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(3)
(1972); See also 33 U.S.C. § 1311: "Except as in compliance with
this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344
of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(a). "The term 'toxic pollutant' means
those pollutants, or combinations of pollutants, including disease-
causing agents, which after discharge and upon exposure, inges-
tion, inhalation or assimilation into any organism, either directly
from the environment or indirectly by ingestion through food
chains, will, on the basis of information available to the Adminis-
trator, cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, ge-
netic mutations, physiological malfunctions (including malfunc-
tions in reproduction) or physical deformations, in such organisms
or their offspring." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1996).
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a federally issued permit 14 called a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.15 The
several states may, upon approval by the Federal Ad-
ministrator, administer their own permit program,
called a State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("SPDES") permit. 16 This SPDES program will, upon
authorization, take the place of the NPDES,17 and will
14. "The Administrator is authorized, after public hearings, to
permit the discharge of a specific pollutant or pollutants under
controlled conditions associated with an approved aquaculture
project under Federal or State supervision pursuant to section
1342 of this title ['National pollutant discharge elimination sys-
tem']." 33 U.S.C. § 1328 (a) (1972) (amended 1977). See infra note
15, for relevant text of this referenced section.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 states, "the Administrator may, after op-
portunity for public hearing, issue a permit for the discharge of any
pollutant, or combination of pollutants . . . upon condition that
such discharge will meet either (A) all applicable requirements un-
der sections 1311 ['Effluent limitations'], 1312 ['Water quality re-
lated effluent limitations'], 1316 ['National standards of perform-
ance'], 1317 ['Toxic and pretreatment effluent standards'], 1318
['Records and reports; inspections'], and 1343 ['Ocean discharge
criteria'] of this title, or (B) prior to the taking of necessary imple-
menting actions relating to all such requirements, such conditions
as the Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the
provisions of this chapter." 33 U.S.C § 1342 (a)(1) (1972). Subsec-
tion (a)(2) goes on to state, "[tihe Administrator shall prescribe con-
ditions for such permits to assure compliance with the require-
ments of paragraph (1) of this subsection." Id.
16. "At any time after the promulgation of the guidelines re-
quired by subsection (i)(2) of subsection 1314 of this title ['Guide-
lines for monitoring, reporting, enforcement, funding, personnel,
and manpower'], the Governor of each State desiring to administer
its own permit program for discharges [of pollution] into navigable
waters within its jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a
full and complete description of the program it proposes to estab-
lish and administer under State law . . . [t]he Administrator shall
approve each such submitted program unless he determines that
adequate authority does not exist .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b)
(1972).
17. "[T]he Administrator shall suspend the issuance of [NPDES]
permits under subsection (a) of this section ['Permits for discharge
of pollutants'] as to those discharges subject to such program un-
less he determines that the State permit program [SPDES] does not
meet the requirements of subsection (b) of this section ['State per-
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assume the authority to issue permits for pollution dis-
charge.,
Under the CWA, permit holders are responsible for
monitoring and reporting pollutant levels in all dis-
charges into navigable waters. 18 These reports, called
"Discharge Monitoring Reports" ("DMRs"), must be sub-
mitted at the intervals specified on the permit.19 If the
holder of a SPDES permit violates the terms 20 of their
permit, the Federal Administrator 2' may notify the
permit holder and their State environmental office of the
violation.22 If the state28 does not commence appropriate
mit programs'] or does not conform to the guidelines issued under
section 1314 (i)(2) of this title ['Guidelines for monitoring, reporting,
enforcement, funding, personnel, and manpower']." 33 U.S.C. §
1342 (c)(1).
18. "ITIhe Administrator shall require the owner or operator of
any point source [i.e. the permit holder] to (i) establish and main-
tain such records, (ii) make such reports, (iii) install, use, and
maintain such monitoring equipment or methods (including where
appropriate, biological monitoring methods), (iv) sample such efflu-
ents (in accordance with such methods, at such locations, at such
intervals, and in such manner as the Administrator shall pre-
scribe), and (v) provide such other information as [the Administra-
tor] may reasonably require." 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (a)(A) (1972).
19. "Monitoring results shall be reported at the intervals speci-
fied elsewhere in this permit .... Monitoring results must be re-
ported on a Discharge Monitoring Report (DMR) or forms provided,
or specified by the Director for reporting results of monitoring of
sludge use or disposal practices." 40 C.F.R. § 122.51(l)(iii)(4)(i)
(1993).
20. For example, exceeding the daily limitation of the pollutant
"fecal coliform" in the discharge from a meat packing plant as re-
ported in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.
Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987).
21. The statute allows the Administrator to use whatever
means she thinks appropriate to gather information that the permit
holder has violated the terms of their permit: "[w]henever, on the
basis of any information available to him." 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (a)(1)
(1972) (amended 1977).
22. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (a)(4): 1a] copy of any order is-
sued under this subsection shall be sent immediately by the Ad-
ministrator to the State in which the violation occurs and other
affected States." Id.
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enforcement action within 30 days, 24 the Administrator
may issue an administrative order,25 commence a civil
action in a federal district court having jurisdiction over
the violator,26 and also seek criminal penalties against
the violator.27
Permit noncompliance under the CWA entails strict li-
ability; thus a defendant's intention to comply or a good
faith attempt to comply does not excuse the fact that the
defendant violated the act. This process is designed to
"avoid the necessity of lengthy fact finding, investiga-
tions, and negotiations . . . [because basing the action
on] relatively narrow fact situations requiring a mini-
mum of discretionary decision making or delay ... [will
result in] the issue before the court [being] a factual one
of whether there had been compliance."28 The CWA, to
be successful, must mandate strict liability and pre-
sume unlawful discharges (i.e. violations of permit efflu-
ent limitations) will conclusively reduce water quality
regardless of the actual amount of discharges because
"definite proof of the proposition is often nearly impos-
sible."29
Citizen suits are meant to dovetail into the enforce-
ment process prescribed by the CWA: "[tihe private en-
23. Assuming, arguendo, that the state has successfully initi-
ated a permit program that supercedes the NPDES program. See
supra note 15 for the statutory underpinning of state authority to
issue permits under the CWA.
24. "Any order issued under this subsection shall be by per-
sonal service ... and shall specify a time for compliance not to ex-
ceed thirty days." 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (a)(5)(A).
25. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (a)(3) noting the procedure for issuing
an administrative order to comply with the terms of the permit.
26. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (b) for the Administrator's authority to
commence a civil action against the violator. See also 33 U.S.C. §
1319 (d) for attachment of civil penalties to a violator.
27. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c) for the procedure relating to mens
rea for criminal penalties. See also infra note 133.
28. Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Upjohn Co., 660 F. Supp. 1397,
1409 (D. Conn. 1987).
29. Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419, 1424 (D. N.J. 1985).
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forcement provision of [the CWA] was designed to serve
a twofold purpose - first to act as a spark to ignite
agency enforcement and second to act as an alternative
enforcement mechanism absent agency enforcement."30
However, there is an intent for citizen suits to "play sec-
ond fiddle" should the proper governmental enforcement
action arise first: "Congress provided . . . that citizen
suits should be subordinate to agency enforcement and
devised restrictions to ensure that result ... [so that] a
defendant would not be subjected simultaneously to
multiple suits, and potentially to conflicting court or-
ders, to enforce the same statutory standards.",1
Under section 1365, there are two broad statutory
limitations (or "preclusions") to citizen suits. First, the
citizen-plaintiff must give notice to specific parties at
least 60 days before their lawsuit may be filed with the
court having jurisdiction; 2 secondly, a citizen-plaintiff
may be barred from instituting a lawsuit if there is an
ongoing action brought by an administrator. 3
30. Upjohn, 660 F. Supp. at 1403 citing Baughman v. Bradford
Coal Co., 592 F. 2d 215, 218 (3rd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
961 (1979).
31. Upjohn, 660 F. Supp. at 1403 (citations omitted).
32. "No action [by the citizen-plaintiff] may be commenced (1)
prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged
violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the al-
leged violation occurs, and (iii) to the standard, limitation, or or-
der." 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b) (1972). Also the statute "preempts" 28
U.S.C § 1332's diversity of citizenship: "[tihe district courts shall
have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or
the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard
or limitation." 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a)(2) (1972).
33. "No action [by the citizen-plaintiff] may be commenced ...
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United
States, or a State to require compliance with the standard, limita-
tion, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United
States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right." 33 U.S.C. §
1365 (b)(1)(B)(1972).
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A. Commencement under section 1365: "[ijf an
Administrator or State has commenced...
afn] action ...."
The statutory word "commenced" is potentially subject
to tremendous latitude in its precise meaning. One may
'commence' an action when counsel begins research on
the case, starts preparing a summons and complaint, or
has the paperwork delivered to the courthouse. How-
ever, courts have interpreted this facet of citizen suit
preclusion very strictly; sometimes their conclusion
rests on a determination of who, in a "race to the court-
house," can file their court papers first.34 Courts seem
to refer to the classical canons of statutory interpreta-
tion in their quest for the meaning of the word 'com-
mence.'.35
For example, in Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v.
N.Y. City Dept. of Envtl. Protection,36 the citizen plaintiff,
after giving the mandatory 60-day notice to all required
parties, filed court, papers at "8:36 a.m. on March 9,
1998."37 The State administrator "filed its court action
at 9:00 a.m. that same day;"38 essentially 24 minutes
later. The District Court held that the citizen suit was
not precluded:
Indeed the State had the opportunity to preempt all
private enforcement efforts, but chose instead, for
whatever reason, to delay enforcement initiatives de-
spite [citizen] plaintiffs' patient and deferential pos-
ture. To deny plaintiffs the opportunity now to seek
compliance by the [defendant] as contemplated by
Congress would essentially deprive them of the
statutory right that Congress saw fit to confer to
them ... . [thus] a stay of these proceedings . . .
34. See Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. City Dept.
of Envtl. Protection, 27 F. Supp 380, 383 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
35. Id.
36. 27 F. Supp 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
37. Id. at 382.
38. Id.
CLEAN WATER ACT
would effectively rewrite the citizen suit provision of
the CWA.39
While earlier in time, but nevertheless continuing this
logic, the court in Chesapeake Bay Found. v. American
Recovery Co.,40 considered strict time constraints and
commented on why this literal interpretation is essen-
tial.41 The defendant had violated the terms of its efflu-
ent discharge permits. 42 After filing the statutorily re-
quired 60-day notice of intent to sue to the required
parties, the citizen-plaintiff filed its suit "first, on Janu-
ary 23, 1984 at 12:34 p.m., and the government then
filed its own action later that day at 3:52 p.m." a little
over 3 hours later. 43  The Fourth Circuit, in a per cu-
riam holding, refused to dismiss the citizen-plaintiffs
suit, holding "Ithe sixty-day waiting period of U.S.C. §
1365 (b)(1)(a) gives the government the opportunity to
act and to control the course of the litigation if it acts
within the [statutorily mandated 60-day] time period ...
[because] jurisdiction is normally determined at the time
of the filing of a complaint."44 Thus, even though there
was a "parallel government suit", the Court of Appeals
would not dismiss the citizen suit.45
39. Id. at 385.
40. 769 F.2d. 207 (4th Cir. 1985).
41. Id. at 208.
42. See Id. at 209.
43. Id. at 208.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. While the Court of Appeals would not allow dismissal of a
previously filed citizen suit because it was "not an appropriate rem-
edy," Id. at 209, it did say, however, that "[tihe district court has
available means, including consolidation, citizen intervention,
U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(1)(B), and intervention by the Administrator,
U.S.C. § 1365 (c)(2), to manage its own docket and to protect de-
fendants from duplicative litigation." Id. (emphasis added). How-
ever, since by the time of appellate review, the government and the
defendant had already negotiated a consent decree that the citizen-
plaintiff had no objections to, the court now saw the appeal as
.moot," and did not remand the case to the district court. For fur-
19991
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Further considering the meaning of the word 'com-
mence,' the court in Conn. Fund for the Envt. v. Upjohn
Co., 46 illustrated how inflexible the statutorily mandated
rule must be. 47 In Upjohn, responding to the defendant
violating the limits of its NPDES permit 1,374 times, the
citizen-plaintiffs filed a federal complaint on August 6,
1985;48 the State administrator filed his complaint on
August 9, 1985.49 The court began its analysis of
whether the citizen suit may be precluded by stating
that "the common meaning of the word [commence] is
'begin' or 'initiate,' but for the purposes of [section 1365]
it must be interpreted as a term of art.5° Specifically, an
action is "'commenced' in federal court when a complaint
is filed."51 Further, "the verb tenses used in [section
13651 subsection (b)(1)(B) and the scheme of the statute
demonstrate that the bar [to citizen suits] was not in-
tended to apply unless the government files suit first...
[thus it held that] the court must apply an inflexible rule
which determines jurisdiction from the time of filing the
complaint."52 Thus, the court interpreted "commence"
very literally and strictly. This is in accordance with the
intent of the statute, because it first gives the govern-
mental authorities a 60 day 'window' after the citizen
group sends notice of its intent to sue, in which to file
their claim. Any other interpretation of the meaning of
the word 'commence' would effectively violate the intent
of the statute.
Should the government not file an action in court, but
merely send an administrative notice of violation or a
similar communication to the violator, can this be con-
ther doctrinal analysis of when a citizen suit is not precluded, see
infra Part IV.
46. 660 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Conn. 1987).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1402.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1403.
51. Id. at 1403 (emphasis added).
52. 660 F. Supp. at 1404 (emphasis added).
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strued as a "commencement"?3 Since the CWA never
defines precisely what "commence" means, courts must
interpret the meaning of the word from precedent and
also context of the surrounding words. In Pub. Interest
Research Group, Inc. v. Elf Atochem 54 the state agency 55
issued the defendant a letter containing, inter alia, in-
structions to take corrective actions 56 for their violation
of the terms of their permit. The district court held that
since this letter merely "served to warn [the] defendant
that an enforcement action might be initiated in the
future"57 the letter did not "commence" the enforcement
proceeding since it made no mention of formal charges,
penalties, or a hearing.58
An example of a court evaluating first a "notice of vio-
lation," then parallel suits by a citizen-plaintiff and then
the Federal Administrator is Atlantic States Legal Found.
v. Koch Refining Co.59 In Koch Refining, the citizen
group, 60 noting that the defendant had violated the lim-
53. For a further exploration of the issue of commencement,
see infra Part I.
54. 817 F. Supp. 1164 (D. N.J. 1993).
55. New Jersey has applied for and been approved by the EPA
to administer its own SPDES program under the auspices of the
New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection and Energy
(NJDEPE). The NJPEDE had received authority from the EPA to
administer the NPDES program in New Jersey in 1982. See idL at
1168.
56. The letter to the defendant read, in part, "you are
DIRECTED to institute measures to correct the deficienc(ies) .. .
Iflailure to fully comply with the above will result in the initiation of
enforcement action by this Department and/or the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency." Id. at 1173 (capitals in original) (em-
phasis added).
57. Id. at, 1173.
58. Additionally, the court noted several previous instances
where a similar letter was sent to the defendant and no enforce-
ment action in a court ensued. See id.
59. 681 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1988).
60. The court noted that the citizen-plaintiff, Atlantic States
Legal Foundation, Inc. was "dedicated to protecting and restoring
natural resources, particularly water resources," Id. at 610, and
stated that, while a New York Corporation, it had "members in
1999]
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its of its effluent permit for several years, filed all
statutory notices with the required parties.61 Some time
after this, the state agency issued a notice of violation to
the defendant.62 The district court noted that the issu-
ance of a violation notice from the State administrator to
the defendant "did not amount to commencing an action
'in a court' of the United States within the meaning of
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B)," dismissing the issue without
further comment. 6 On July 13, 1997, after the sixty
day waiting period, the citizen-plaintiffs filed their com-
plaint with the court.64 Exactly three months after that,
the federal Administrator "commenced its own action
against [the defendant]."65 The court concluded that the
citizen action "was properly filed under section 1365,"66
and even though the (then) recently decided Gwaltney
case67 was advancing the supplemental rather than
leading role for citizen suits, the holding "does not ...
create a judicial gloss on the plain language of section
1365 . .. [because] '[aibsent a clearly expressed legisla-
tive intent to the contrary [the] language [of the statute]
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' 68
Similarly, in Pub. Interest Research Group v. N.J. Ec-
pressway Auth.,69 after notices sent by the State re-
garding defendant's violations, the defendant entered
various states (including Minnesota)," id, illustrating the "identifi-
able trifle" concept. See supra note 7.
61. Id. at 610-11 n.1.
62. See id. at 611 n.2.
63. Id. at 611 n.2. The defendant in this case "[did] not con-
tend otherwise", so, unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on
its reasoning as to why the notice of violation was not a com-
mencement.
64. See id. at 611.
65. Id., citing the Minnesota District Court case, U.S. v. Koch
Refining Co., No. CIVIL 3-87-708 (D. Minn. 1987).
66. Id. at 612.
67. See infra note 89 and accompanying text for more informa-
tion on the Gwaltney case.
68. Koch Refining, 681 F. Supp. at 613.
69. 822 F. Supp. 174 (D. N.J. 1992).
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into a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) with the
State environmental agency. 70  The citizen-plaintiffs
brought their action subsequent to this "proceeding".71
The district court, considering the issue of preclusion of
the citizen suit, held that the issuance and signing of
the MOU was not the commencement of an enforcement
action because it was not issued in court, 72 because the
MOU issued under state law was not "comparable" to
the federal statute,73 and because there were no penal-
ties assessed against the defendant. 74
However, where the administrative order issued more
closely resembles a court action, some courts have held
that citizen suits may be precluded. In Ark. Wildlife
Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc, 75 the defendant consented to
enter into a Consent Administrative Order ("CAO") sev-
eral months prior to an action brought by a citizen-
plaintiff. The CAO stated that it was in full settlement
of civil penalties for the defendant's violations of the
CWA, and also provided that "interested third parties
70. The terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
were that the defendant would not have to pay monetary penalties
for the violation of his permit, but instead required him to con-
struct new piping to channel effluent to an offsite wastewater
treatment plant and to submit a schedule for this construction.
Additionally, the MOU "substantially relaxed both the interim and
final effluent limitations contained in the permit and indicated that
these new relaxed limitations would remain in effect until [the de-
fendant could connect to the off-site POTW facility]." Id. at 178.
71. The court stated, "[tihe Department ... began its 'proceed-
ing' against defendant by sending the proposed MOU along with a
cover letter, which neither specified the amount of penalty to be
imposed nor advised of the right to a hearing." Id. at 184 n. 13.
72. See supra note 63.
73. The court said, "[wihile the federal law requires notice to
the public of enforcement actions along with the opportunity to
comment on any proposed order and to participate in a hearing...
no such provisions for public involvement exist in the state statute
or regulations." Id. at 184 n. 14.
74. See id. at 184.
75. 29 F.3d 376 (8th Oir. 1994). See infra notes 85-87 and ac-
companying text for a further discussion of the issues in this case.
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had a right to intervene ... certain notice and hearing
procedures became available to interested third parties.
• . [and] [mloreover, [defendant] became subject to fur-
ther penalties for failure to comply with the CAO."76 The
Eighth Circuit held that "states are allowed some lati-
tude in selecting the specific mechanisms of their en-
forcement program," 77 and since the CAO would allow
intervention, notice, and assessment of future penalties,
the issuance of a CAO was equivalent to a court action,
therefore "commencement."78
Thus, for issues of "who filed first" in a court action,
the first prong of citizen suit preclusion usually consists
of a fairly mechanical determination of which party (i.e.
the government or the citizen-plaintiffs), after the
statutorily mandated notice and waiting period, deliv-
ered their papers into the hands of a court clerk and
thereby filed with the court. According to some of the
above holdings (where a 'strict interpretation' is used)
the word "commence" can be interpreted to mean,
"stamped as entered by the court." If the government
files first, the citizen suit may be precluded; if the citi-
zen-plaintiff files first, he, without more, may not be
precluded from bringing suit against the violator. Con-
versely, if an Administrative Order entered into by the
government sufficiently resembles a court action, it may
(in some jurisdictions) be deemed to be a "commence-
ment" of an action.
B. Diligent Prosecution under section 1365: "[if the
Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an] . . . action in a court."
Under section 1365, if, at the time of citizen suit
commencement, the EPA or the State is "diligently
76. Id. at 380.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court"79 an
otherwise properly brought citizen suit may nevertheless
be precluded. Courts pondering the meaning of the
word "diligently" have found an, albeit rebuttable, pre-
sumption of diligence;80 it has been held that "[t]he court
must presume the diligence of the state's prosecution of
a defendant absent persuasive evidence that the state
has engaged in a pattern of conduct .. .that could be
considered dilatory, collusive or otherwise in bad
faith.-81
Illustrating this presumption, in North and South Riv-
ers Watershed Assoc. Inc. v. Town of Scituate82 the court
concluded that even the issuance of an Administrative
Order is diligent prosecution when the Order represents
"substantial, considered and ongoing response to the
[defendant's] violation."83  The court moved far away
from the 'literal' statutory interpretation as found above
by the courts considering the word "commence," stating,
"[tihe focus of the statutory bar to citizen's suits is not
on state statutory construction, but on whether correc-
tive action already taken and diligently pursued by the
government seeks to remedy the same violations as du-
plicative civilian action."84
Additionally, diligence cannot be measured in terms of
the citizen-plaintiffs values or standards but instead,
due deference must be given to the State or Federal
agency.85 In Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc, 86
the court held "ilt would be unreasonable and inappro-
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(1)(B) (1972). See supra note 33 for the
complete text of this section.
80. See Conn. Fund for the Env't v. Contract Plating Co., 631 F.
Supp. 1291, 1293 (D. Conn. 1986).
81. Id.
82. 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991).
83. Id. at 557.
84. Id. at 556.
85. See Ark. Wildlife Fed'n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376
(8th Cir. 1994).
86. Id.
1999]
92 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
priate to find failure to diligently prosecute simply be-
cause [the defendant/violator] prevailed in some fashion
or because a compromise [with the government agency]
was reached." 87 Thus, this logic directly links back to
Scituate, "[wlhere an agency has specifically addressed
the concerns of an analogous citizen's suit, deference to
the agency's plan of attack should be particularly fa-
vored."88
Further, the legislative history of citizen suits notes
that "'the great volume of enforcement actions [are in-
tended to] be brought by the State and that citizen suits
are proper only 'if the Federal, State, and local agencies
fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility."' 89
Thus, a claimed lack of diligence must rise to the level of
a catastrophic failure by the governing agency for a citi-
zen-plaintiff to defeat preclusion based only on the dili-
gence prong 'under the CWA. For example, in Atlantic
States Legal Found., Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping
Co.90 the apparent willingness of the State agency to
"bend its procedures on [defendant's] behalf," the "leni-
ent penalty assessment of only $10,000 for the hun-
dreds of reported violations, despite statutory authority
for penalties of $25,000 per violation" and the statement
by the defendant's president that the state's "adminis-
trative proceeding had little effect upon [defendant's]
efforts to comply with its permit [and] that it was [the
citizen plaintiffs] threat of a lawsuit that spurned the
87. Id. at 380, citing Contract Plating, 631 F. Supp. at 1294:
"[tihe mere fact that the settlement reached in the state action was
less burdensome to the defendant than the remedy sought in the
[citizen suit] is not sufficient in itself to overcome the presumption
that the state action was diligently prosecuted." Id. (emphasis
added).
88. Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557.
89. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987), quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 64
(197 1), reprinted in 2A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1482 (1973).
90. 735 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Ind. 1990).
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defendant to action"91 led the court to conclude that the
state's proceeding was not "diligent prosecution under
the [CWA]." 92
Similarly, in N.Y. Coastal Fisherman's Assoc. v. N.Y.
City Dep't of Sanitation,93 the defendant was responsible
for the maintenance of a previously closed landfill that
had been discharging leachate94 on surrounding proper-
ties since 1982. 91 The State, after investigating the
sources of the complaints, had entered into an Order of
Consent with the defendant in 1985, and had entered
into a second Order of Consent in 1990 that required a
remedial plan be filed with the State by 1995.96 The de-
fendant, meanwhile had curtailed allowing the leachate
to merely discharge on neighbor's properties and had,
amazingly, devised and implemented a plan to discharge
the leachate directly into the nearby Bay, apparently
with State approval.97 The court, calling the entire mess
a "bureaucratic and political nightmare," scathingly
classified the State's involvement as "a pen pal, not a
prosecutor."98 The court held the State's action was not
diligent, because the twelve year period that the defen-
dant had to merely submit a proposal for elimination of
the pollution discharge was "simply too long to rectify a
91. Id. at 1416-17.
92. Id. at 1417.
93. 772 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
94. "Leachate refers to that substance which is created when,
over a period of time, compression of the solid waste and other ref-
use contained in the landfill, forces liquid from the refuse .... The
resultant liquid, or leachate, takes on the properties of certain con-
stituents of the refuse. Leachate typically is very concentrated,
high in metal and organic constituents." Id. at 163 n. 1, citing Hud-
son River Fishermen's Ass'n v. County of Westchester, 646 F.
Supp. 1044, 1046 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
95. In 1979, "the landfill was closed, but not effectively capped,
[and since] 1982 complaints about leachate streams and ponds
were lodged by individuals living in the vicinity of the landfill."
Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n, 772 F. Supp. at 163.
96. See id. at 163-64.
97. See id. at 164-68.
98. Id. at 168.
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problem that has been known about since 1983 ...
[and further, it] is simply incomprehensible that the dis-
charge of leachate into Eastchester Bay, which was to
be a temporary measure adopted to remedy the prob-
lem, should continue for seven years."99
Curiously, while other environmental statutes allow
preclusion of citizen suits either for actions in a court or
through administrative proceedings,100 section 1365 only
refers to "courts" and no other express alternative.1 o1
Nevertheless, courts have still had some confusion as to
99. Id. at 169.
100. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619
(b)(1)(B) (1976) (amended 1992) ("if the Administrator has com-
menced and is diligently prosecuting a proceeding for the issuance
of an order under section 2615 (a)(2) of this title to require compli-
ance with this chapter or order pr if the Attorney General has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a court of
the United States to require compliance with this chapter.") Id.
(emphasis added); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540
(g)(2)(A) (1973)(amended 1988) ("(it) if the Secretary has commenced
action to impose a penalty pursuant to subsection (a) of this sec-
tion; or (iII) If the United States has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a criminal action in a court of the United States or a
State to redress a violation of any such provision or regulation." )
Id. (emphasis added); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415 (g)(2) (1972) (amended 1992) ("(B) if the At-
torney General has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil
action in a court of the United States ... pr (C) if the Administrator
has commenced action to impose a penalty pursuant to subsection
(a) of this section, or if the Administrator, or the Secretary, has ini-
tiated permit revocation or suspension proceedings . . . r (D) if the
United States has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a
criminal action in a court of the United States or a State to redress
a violation of this subchapter.") Id. (emphasis added); and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (b) (1976)
(amended 1984) ("if the Administrator... (i) has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting an action under section 6973 of this title ...
(ii) is actually engaging in a removal action removal action under
section 104 ... (iii) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Inves-
tigation and Feasibility Study under section 104 . . .r (iv) has ob-
tained a court order (including a consent decree) or issued an ad-
ministrative order under section 106.") Id. (emphasis added).
101. See supra note 33 for relevant text of § 1365 (b).
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what the meaning of the words "in a court" is, even
though the words are expressly stated in the statute. 102
In an early case of first impression, 103 the court in
Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 0 4 acknowledged that
"[generally, the word 'court' in a statute is held to refer
only to the tribunals of the judiciary and not to those of
an executive agency with quasi-judicial powers." 05 The
Third Circuit was concerned, however, about the per-
ceived necessity to "provide for citizens' suits in a man-
ner that would be least likely to clog already burdened
federal courts and [be] most likely to trigger govern-
mental action which would alleviate any need for Judi-
cial relief."0 6  Thus, for the practical justification of
easing clogged dockets of the federal courts, the court in
Baughman set aside the plain language of the statute,'0 7
holding "[ilt follows that to constitute a 'court' in which
proceedings by the State will preclude private enforce-
ment actions under [the Clean Air Act], a tribunal must
have the power to accord relief which is substantially
102. See, e.g., Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215
(3rd Cr. 1979); see also infra notes 105-109. But see Friends of
the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2nd Cir. 1985); see
also infra notes 110-17.
103. While the court in this case was actually construing the
Clean Air Act, it looked to the Clean Water Act for guidance be-
cause the statutory text is substantially similar. See Infra note 107
for the relevant text of the Clean Air Act.
104. 592 F.2d 215 (3rd Cir. 1979).
105. Id. at 217, citing United States v. Frantz, 220 F.2d 123,
125 (3rd Cir. 1955).
106. Baughman, 592 F.2d at 218, citing City of Highland Park v.
Train, 519 F. 2d 681, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975), referring to Remarks
of Senator Muskie, 116 Cong. Rec. 32926, 33102 (1970) and Re-
marks of Senator Hart, Id. at 33183.
107. The court quoted the relevant section of the Clean Air Act:
.no such action may be commenced . . . 'if the Administrator or
State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action In
a court of the United States to require compliance with the stan-
dard.'" Baughman, 592 F.2d at 217, citing 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(b)(1)(B). For a brief discussion relevant to the potential dangers in
a court 'usurping' a legislative function and its relation to the Sepa-
ration of Powers doctrine, see infra Part IV.
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equivalent to that available to the EPA in federal courts
under the Clean Air Act." 08  Consequently, Baughman
adopted the "Alice in Wonderland" approach to statutory
interpretation. 109
Conversely (and thus more toward 'classical' statutory
interpretation), in Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail
Corp."0 enforcement actions by the State culminated in
consent orders."' These orders were posited by the de-
fendant to be the "functional equivalent of a diligently
prosecuted action in a court and therefore [they should]
108. Id. at 219. Moreover, other courts elaborated on what
specific powers are necessary to allow the tribunal to be the func-
tional equivalent of a court: "[tihe Baughman test requires that (1)
the state agency have coercive powers to compel compliance [with
statutory limitations] and (2) [that] there be procedural similarities
to a suit in federal court with citizens having the right to inter-
vene." Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Universal Tool & Stamping
Co., 735 F. Supp. 1404, 1414 (D. Ind. 1990) (italics added).
109. "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean- neither
more nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can
make words mean so many different things." "The question is," said
Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master- that's all." Louis CARROLL,
THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 106-09 (Schocken Books 1987)
(1872), cited in Conn. Coastal Fisherman's Assoc. v. Remington
Arms Co.,, 989 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D. Ind. 1993), stating that the
meaning Congress had intended for several key words as contained
in RCRA have an "'Alice in Wonderland' air about [them]." Id. Ap-
parently, Mr. Carroll's work is a favorite of other legal scholars as
well; Professor Singer, in his revision of Sutherland's classic "Stat-
utes and Statutory Construction" also uses a reference to Mr.
Dumpty: "[tihis is not to say that custom or convention does not
establish standard or usual meanings in language usage. Thus in
Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty can use the
word 'glory' to mean a 'nice knock down argument' if he wants to,
but if he wants Alice to understand him he would do better to use
words which in everyday speech are more generally understood to
have that meaning." See SUTHERLAND, supra note 11, § 45.07 at
32.
110. 768 F.2d 57 (2nd Cir. 1985).
111. In this case there were actually two separate citizen suits
against the same defendant, although they were originally argued
separately, that were consolidated for opinion because they arose
from similar facts and presented a similar legal question. Id. at 58.
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operate to bar [citizen-plaintiff s] suits""1 as inspired by
the Baughman .3 decision. While the court felt the facts
in the Friends of the Earth case did not meet the
Baughman test, this was irrelevant because the court
held that "the language [i.e. the words "in a court" was]
clear and unambiguous, [and thus] Judicial inquiry is
complete"4 except in 'rare and exceptional circum-
stances' . . . [where] 'only the most extraordinary show-
ing of contrary intentions from [the legislative history]
would justify a limitation on the plain meaning of the
statutory language."' 1 5 Although the court recognized
the obvious danger that unlimited public actions might
disrupt the implementation of the Act and overburden
courts," 6 it nevertheless stated that "Congress made
clear that citizen groups are not to be treated as nui-
sances or troublemakers but rather as welcomed par-
ticipants in the vindication of environmental
interests.""17 Thus, a "court is a court and an adminis-
trative consent order is not."
Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc"18 considered the
merits of both the Baughman and the Friends of the
Earth holdings."19 The State Administrator had issued
an order requiring the defendant to cease violating its
112. Id. at 61.
113. See supra notes 104-08 and -accompanying text for the
relevant material on the Baughman test.
114. For some extremely interesting research materials on the
science of statutory interpretation and the intent of the legislature,
see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL CouRTs
AND THE LAW 14-18 (Princeton University Press 1997). Judge Scalia
states that, i[b]y far the greatest part of what I and all federal
judges do is to interpret the meaning of federal statutes and federal
agency regulations." Id. at 14-15. In his book, Judge Scalia goes
on to illustrate the several "classic" treatises in the field of statu-
tory interpretation, some of which are quoted in this Note.
115. Friends of the Earth, 768 F.2d at 62-63, quoting Garcia v.
United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984).
116. The court's precise concern in Baughman, supra note 104.
117. Friends of the Earth, 768 F.2d at 62.
118. 834 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987).
119. Id. at 1521, 1524-25.
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permit and to build a new wastewater treatment
facility. 120 Subsequent to this, but not before a citizen
suit had been filed, the State assessed fines against the
defendant for recent violations. 12' After the court ana-
lyzed the contrary holdings of both Baughman and
Friends of the Earth cases, it noted that Congress, in
other environmental acts, had references to either
courts or administrative actions. 22 This proved that
Congress, if it intended, could have easily written both
alternatives into the plain language of section 1365,
which clearly could "dispel[] any ambiguity in the term
'courts' as used in section 1365 [; moreover, defendant]
has cited no legislative history that would justify the
extraordinary step of ignoring the plain language of
[Section 1365]. "123 The court denied preclusion, stating
"33 U.S.C. § 1365 unambiguously requires that action
be in a literal 'court,' so that agency action outside of a
court will never bar a citizen enforcement suit."124
In light of the above cases, "[ilt is well settled that 'the
starting point for interpreting a statute is the language
of the statute itself,"' 125 thus it may be postulated that
the meaning of words in a statute may come from sur-
rounding words, and also from the wording of similar
statutes. 126 The word "court" has a 'plain meaning' to all
120. See id. at 1520.
121. For a timeline of the events of this case, see td. at 1519-
20.
122. For examples of these other environmental statutes that
have the alternatives of either courts or administrative actions in
their wording, see supra note 100.
123. Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1525.
124. Id. at 1524.
125. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987), quoting Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
126. "Where the meaning of a statute has not been settled,
courts use (several] tools: (1) the wording of the statutory section at
issue; (2) any statutory context that might indicate the legislature's
intent: other sections of the same statute, other statutes addressed
to the same subject matter, the heading of the section at issue, and
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who hear it; thus, "[wihere the language is plain and
admits of no more than one meaning the duty of inter-
pretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid
doubtful meanings need no discussion."127 Since other,
similar environmental statutes clearly use either courts
or administrative proceedings as a bar to citizen suits,
including only "court" in section 1365 evinces a clear
intent by Congress to preclude citizen suits solely in the
event that the government is diligently prosecuting a
suit against the violator in a court. Any other interpre-
tation would eviscerate the plain meaning of the statute.
However, the practicality (or reasonableness) of this
strict interpretation still remains to be seen: "[ilt is fun-
damental .. .that departure from the literal construc-
tion of a statute is justified when such a construction
would produce an absurd result and would clearly be
inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in
question."128
C. Prosecution under section 1319: "the Administrator
[or State] has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an
action under this subsection ... shall not be the subject
of a civil penalty action under... section 1365 of this
title."
Formalistically speaking, while Baughman was an in-
correct statutory interpretation of the words "in a
court", nevertheless, it did presage the practical reality
of section 1365's rigidity which resulted in additional
cases (where extensive adjudication was not necessary)
and added to an already overburdened federal court
the statute's title and preamble (if any); (3) the historical context:
the events and conditions that might have motivated the legislature
to act; (4) the context created by announcements of public policy in
other statutes and case law. . ." RIcHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL
REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE 139
(Little, Brown and Company, 2d ed. 1994) (emphasis in original).
127. SUTHERLAND, supra note 11 § 46.01, at 81.
128. Id. § 45.12, at 61.
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system. 129 In 1987, Congress amended the CWA by
adding section 1319(g) .10 which, inter alia, allowed pre-
clusion of citizen suits for certain kinds of administra-
tive actions not "in a court."
Violations under the CWA may be enforced by the
Administrator in several ways. First, the Administrator
may issue a compliance order'3' that orders the violator
to cease and desist his permit violations. -Also, the Ad-
ministrator may commence a civill , 2 or criminal3 3 action
129. See supra discussion on Baughman notes 104-08 and ac-
companying text for the court's incorrect statutory interpretation,
in terms of classical statutory interpretation, of the words "in a
court."
130. The relevant text of this section is "[a]ction taken by the
Administrator or the Secretary, as the case may be, under this
subsection shall not affect or limit the Administrator's or Secre-
tary's authority to enforce any provision of this chapter; except that
any violation ... (I) with respect to which the Administrator or the
Secretary has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action
under this subsection, (ii) with respect to which a State has com-
menced and is diligently prosecuting an action under a State law
comparable to this subsection, or (iii) for which the Administrator,
the Secretary, or the State has issued a final order not subject to
further judicial review and the violator has paid a penalty assessed
under this subsection or such comparable State law, as the case
may be, shall not be the subject of a civil penalty action under sub-
section (d) of this section ['Civil penalties; factors considered in de-
termining amount'] or section 132 1(b) of this title ['Oil and hazard-
ous substance liability'] or section 1365 of this title ['Citizen
suits']." 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g) (1987) (emphasis added).
131. "Whenever on the basis of any information available to him
the Administrator finds that any person is in violation of. . . any
permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in
a permit issued under section 1342 of this title ['Permits for dis-
charge of pollutants'] by him or by a State or in a permit issued
under section 1344 ['Permits for dredged or fill material'] of this
title by a state, he shall issue an order requiring such person to
comply with such section or requirement." 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (a)(3)
(1972) (section references omitted).
132. "The Administrator is authorized to commence a civil ac-
tion for appropriate relief, including a permanent or temporary In-
junction, for any violation for which he is authorized to issue a
compliance order under subsection (a) of this section." 33 U.S.C. §
1319 (b).
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against the violator, seeking an injunction, penalties, or
imprisonment. Finally, the Administrator may assess
an administrative penalty-4 against the violator that en-
compasses two classes of civil penalties. Additionally,
private citizens may initiate actions against violators for
either injunctive relief or penalties that will be deposited
into the United States Treasury. 3 5
133. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (c) for criminal penalties for negli-
gent violations (subsection (1)); knowing violations (subsection (2));
knowing endangerment (subsection (3)); and false statements (sub-
section (4)) for the criminal mens rea requirements of this portion
of the CWA enforcement procedures.
.134. "Whenever on the basis of any information available ...
the Administrator for the Secretary of the Army] finds that any per-
son has violated ... any permit condition or limitation implement-
ing any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of
this title by the Administrator or by a State, or in a permit issued
under section 1344 of this title by a State ... the Administrator or
Secretary, as the case may be, may, after consultation with the
State in which the violation occurs, assess a class I civil penalty or
a class II civil penalty under this subsection." 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)
(1987). The section goes on to describe the classes of penalties
(subsection (2)); determining the penalty amount (subsection (3));
and rights of interested persons (subsection (4)). Id.
135. "Although the statute provides that a citizen sues 'on his
own behalf,' any penalties recovered from such an action are paid
into the United States Treasury. Unlike a qui tam action, where a
volunteer plaintiff can recover part of a penalty, in this action, a
plaintiff recovers nothing. Any benefit from the lawsuit, whether
injunctive or monetary, inures to the public or to the United
States." Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1522 (italics added). The court,
while basically correct in its assertion, has missed one small point:
under § 1365, the citizen plaintiff may sue to recover, of course not
penalties, but his own attorney fees and "Ithe court, in issuing any
final order in any action brought pursuant to this section may
award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such
award is appropriate." 33 U.S.C § 1365 (d) (1972). Case law has
refined this to mean award of attorney fees to "prevailing parties."
"[these [attorney] fees are available even if the citizen's claims are
dismissed after termination of a parallel agency enforcement ac-
tion, so long as the citizen suit played a role in bringing about the
successful termination of the agency action." Old Timer v. Black-
hawk-Central City Sanitation District, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D.
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The language of section 1319(g) states that civil suits
brought by citizen-plaintiffs may be precluded if the
Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting an "action under this subsection", which,
by inference, translates to an "administrative penalt[y]"
action, since these words are the subsection's title In
cases where something other than an administrative
penalty action (for example a Compliance Order) has
arisen, there is a decided circuit split as to whether this
other action can also preclude an otherwise properly
brought citizen suit; in essence, what do the words
"administrative penalty" actually mean. The two parts
below explore, statutorily speaking, a 'narrow' interpre-
tation or a 'broad' interpretation of precisely when and
how an administrative penalty action may preclude a
citizen suit.
II. THE CIRCUrr SPLIT
A. The Ninth Circuit: Consistent Refinement; Narrow
Scope
Ninth Circuit cases considering attempts by the de-
fendant at citizen suit preclusion are good examples of
holdings in successive cases that logically proceed and
further explore and refine the original holding. The logic
can be clearly tracked, and the expansion of the holding
is easily identifiable. An example of this progression,
the initial question in Washington Public Interest Re-
Colo. 1999); see also Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124 (2nd Cir. 1991) ("Although the case may
be subject to dismissal, the function of the citizen suit- the cessa-
tion of violations of the Clean Water Act- will have been served ...
[and since] the existence of the citizen suit was a motive for the
polluter's settlement [the court finds] the citizen suit plaintiff is
therefore a prevailing party [and may be awarded attorney fees].")
Id. at 128. Since attorney fees are not usually awarded to the pre-
vailing party (as they are in England), it may be postulated that
these are 'penalties' in this specific situation.
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search Group v. Pendleton Woolen Mills ("Washington
PIRG")'1 6 was whether an administrative compliance or-
der 137 issued before the filing of a CWA based citizen suit
could preclude the suit.'3 8 The court noted that the ad-
ministrative compliance order was issued pursuant to
section 1319(a) ("State enforcement; compliance or-
ders"), not section 1319(g) ("Administrative penalties")3 9
and that "the imposition of an administrative penalty
requires elaborate procedures including hearings as well
as public notice and comment, none of which [the com-
pliance order requires)." 40 Additionally, "if Congress
had intended to preclude citizen suits in the face of an
administrative compliance order, it could easily have
done so, as it has done in certain other environmental
statutes."14' The court held that it may not look beyond'
136. 11 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1993).,
137. The EPA issued order "required [defendant] to prepare a
report describing the causes of the violations and identifying those
actions necessary to bring it into compliance . . . [further, it] re-
quired [defendant] to make those physical improvements identified
as necessary . . . [finally, the order] included the threat of a sanc-
tion of $25,000 per day if [defendant] violated [the order's] terms."
Id. at 884-85.
138. The court could not make any factual findings as to
whether the defendant continued to violate its permit limitations
after the administrative compliance order was issued; the court
apparently deemed this irrelevant in its holding since it did not re-
mand the case to the district court for a finding on this specific
factual item (although it did remand to the district court for other
reasons). See id.
139. While Washington PIRG was decided some 3 years before
UNOCAL, see infra note 143, there is a continuation of logic to even
individual provisions in the federal statutes being "comparable" to §
1319 (g). However, it can be argued that the logical "scrutiny" oc-
curred precisely reverse of what one would envision: it might be
expected that the State provisions would be construed first, and
then the federal as an extension of the logic between federal-state
.comparability."
140. Washington PIRG, 11 F.3d at 885.
141. Id. at 886, citing Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (b)(2)(B)(iv) (1976) ("barring citizen suit
when the EPA has issued an abatement order"); also citing Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
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the plain language of the statute; thus, "the... statute
does not bar citizen suits absent an administrative pen-
alty action."14 1
Continuing this logic, in Citizens for a Better Environ-
ment- Cal. v. Union Oil Ca ("UNOCAL"), 14-3 responding to
the defendant's violation of its permit discharge limita-
tions, the State issued a cease and desist order
("CDO")144 and subsequently entered into a settlement
agreement with the defendant who agreed to, inter alia,
make a payment of $780,000.145 As a counter argument
to the citizen suit filed some three months after the set-
tlement was executed, the defendant sought preclusion
by arguing that the money paid was a penalty, and that
the CDO was comparable to an administrative penalty
action. 46 However, the court agreed with the citizen-
plaintiffs arguments and interpreted the sum paid as a'
"payment" instead of a "penalty" because: (1) the defen-
dant himself insisted on classifying the financial trans-
fer as a "payment" and not a "penalty" at the time of the
settlement;147 (2) by classifying the sum as a payment
(and thus outside the context of the penalty language in
the statute), the defendant "avoided a significant level of
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (d)(2) (1986) ("barring citizen suit
when the EPA is 'diligently prosecuting an action . . . to require
compliance'"). Id.
142. 11 F.3d at 886 (emphasis added).
143. 83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996).
144. The CDO stated that, "[t]he Regional Board has considered
the various enforcement and penalty options available to it re-
garding the violation [of the NPDES permit] .... Under the circum-
stances detailed [in the case Findings] above, the Regional Board
has determined that the most appropriate course of action is set-
tlement of the litigation and issuance of a cease and desist order."
Id. at 1116 n.1.
145. Id. at 1116.
146. See id.
147. "[Ciounsel for [defendant] . . .stated ... that [defendant]
would not, at the time of the settlement of the state lawsuit, sign
on to paperwork that characterized it as a penalty because of the
punitive and bad conduct implications that the general public
takes from that term." Id. at 1116.
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scrutiny as to the nature and amount of a penalty;" 148
and (3) while administrative penalties are mandated to
be paid within 30 days from their being imposed, the
defendant "was not required to make half of its payment
until a year after the settlement was entered into. " 149
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the CDO was merely a
"settlement made to avoid an enforcement action [and
thus was] the price of avoiding the stigma of a formal
enforcement action." 5 0 Since there was no "penalty,"
there cannot be an administrative penalty action.
Therefore, the citizen suit that arose after the settlement
agreement but before the sum was paid in full, could
not be precluded.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, in UNOCAL, pondered
the meaning of "State law comparable15 1 to [administra-
tive penalties listed in § 13191" in terms of a penalty as-
sessed under a related State provision and not the state
provision that is actually comparable to section 1319;
thus, questioning whether a state's decision not to util-
ize the comparable state law penalty provision (and use
a similar, but "non-comparable" provision) negates the
"comparability" of the state action. 52 The court held the
148. Id. For example, the court stated that there was "no as-
surance that [defendant] has fully disgorged the benefit it receives
[sic] from violating effluent standards." Id.
149. UNOCAL, 83 F.3d at 1116.
150. Id.
151. The court stated, "[ilt is undisputed that the penalty provi-
sion in § 13385 of the California Water Code is comparable to the
federal Clean Water Act penalty provision of 33 U.S.C. § 1319." Id.
at 1116-17.
152. In essence, if one penalty provision is "comparable," are all
penalty provisions "comparable" or should we consider each provi-
sion for "comparability"? A strict construction of this question
could conclude that all provisions must be considered independ-
ently; merely because one part is "comparable" does not mean that
all parts are. See, e.g., Washington PIRG, Infra notes 136-42. Ac-
cord, SUTHERLAND, supra note 11 § 47.02, at 138: "[ihf the meaning
of any particular phrase or section standing alone is clear no other
section or part of the act may be applied to create doubt." Id., cit-
ing United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626 (1978). However, a
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related state provision was not "comparable" for several
reasons.153 First, "this is the plainest reading of the
statutory language."154 Second, due to the various no-
tice and assessment provisions under section 1319,
unless the penalty is assessed using a "comparable"
state provision, "there is no guarantee that the public
will be given the requisite opportunity to participate [in
the proceeding] or that the penalty assessed is of the
proper magnitude." 155 Lastly, a more liberal interpreta-
tion may lead to citizen suit preclusions that are
broader'5 6 than Congress intended.
Continuing this progression, the court in Knee Deep
Cattle Co. v. Bindana Inv. Co. 157 provided a refinement of
more liberal interpretation of the statute might find that as long as
the overall goals of the state and federal statutes are the same,
specific provisions in the state statutory scheme can be interpreted
within the context of its overall comparability with the federal stat-
ute. See, e.g., Scituate, supra notes 82-84; see also Ark. Wildlife,
supra notes 75-78 and 85-87.
153. See UNOCAL, 83 F.3d at 1118 (discussing the elements of
this "rule").
154. Id. The court went on to elaborate by quoting several
sources: "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the lan-
guage of the statute itself." Id& at n.4, quoting Gwaltney of Smith-
field, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found. Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987).
Additionally, "[aibsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to
the contrary, that language [as stated in the statute] must ordinar-
ily be regarded as conclusive." UNOCAL, 83 F.3d at 1118 n.4,
quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 447
U.S. 102, 108 (1980). Therefore, "[ilf the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court ... must give ef-
fect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." UNOCAL,
83 F.3d at 1118 n.4, quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
155. UNOCAL, 83 F.3d at 1118.
156. For example, an action outside of the statutorily limited
scope of preclusion based on administrative penalty actions, and
perhaps allowing preclusion where a mere Consent Order has been
executed. The court further elaborated on this, stating "[niothing
in the language and structure of ... § 1319 (g)6)(A) in any way
suggests that Congress intended such a dichotomy." Id.
157. 94 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1996).
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the administrative penalty issue.15 8 In Knee Deep, the
defendant violated the terms of its permit, and the State
issued a Notice of Noncompliance ("NON") followed by a
Notice of Permit Violation ("NPV"159 and a Notice of Civil
Penalty ("NCP") which assessed a civil penalty for one
such violation that Was later paid by the defendant.160
Subsequent to this, the defendant and the State pri-
vately entered into a Stipulation and Final Order
("SFO') 61 which settled defendant's past violations with-
out penaty.161 Several months after the SFO execution,
the State issued Penalty Demand Notices for violations
occurring after the SFO, but did not impose these penal-
ties for violation of defendant's NPDES permit In a later
hearing to dismiss the subsequent citizen suit, the
Ninth Circuit held that the SFO was not "comparable" to
section 1319(g) because, to preclude a citizen suit, "the
comparable state law must contain penalty provisions
and a penalty must actually have been assessed under
[that portion ofl the state law."163
Building on the several previous cases, the Ninth Cir-
cuit further refined its preclusion test in Sierra Club v.
Hyundai America, Inc.164 Though the facts are similar to
Knee Deep, there is an added twist: the penalties were
158. Id. at 517.
159. "The NPV notified [defendant] that [his] reports showed
discharges exceeding its permit limitations, and required [defen-
dant] to submit a written proposal to bring the facility into compli-
ance with the permit or face penalties." Id. at 515.
160. Id.
161. "The SFO outlined a plan to upgrade [defendant's facility]
at a cost of $175,000 to $200,000 land also] set penalties for non-
compliance with [agreed] interim [permit] limits as well as for viola-
tions of the compliance schedule." Id.
162. The SFO did, however, "reserve . . . the [State's] right to
proceed against [defendant] for any past or future violations not
settled in the SFO." Id.
163. Knee Deep, 94 F.3d at 516 (emphasis added), citing
UNOCAL, 83 F.3d at 1115; also citing Washington PIRG, 11 F.3d at
883.
164. 23 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Or. 1977).
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assessed by the State after the notice of intent to bring a
citizen suit under the CWA. 165 The district court held
that "the provisions of [state] law that [state adminis-
trators] acted under before plaintiffs notice of intent to
sue must contain penalty provisions, and any penalty
must have actually been assessed before the notice of
intent to sue as well."166
Thus, the Ninth Circuit has consistently refined and
narrowed the scope of citizen suit preclusion under the
CWA, using a strict interpretation of the. statute's lan-
guage. This logic seems to agree with Justice Scalia's
partial dissent in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found. Inc. 67 in which, discussing whether
subject matter jurisdiction arose from a reading of the
language of the statute, he argued that it "'depends on
the state of things at the time of the action brought'; if it
existed when the suit was brought, 'subsequent events
cannot ousIt]' the [meaning of the statute's plain
words]."168
B. Other Circuits: One Step Backward or Have We Gone
Too Far... With a "Twist"
Conversely, cases that support citizen-plaintiff preclu-
sion independent of penalties being assessed under
section 1319 seem to be motivated by the court's con-
cern that too narrow a scope of preclusion will result in
elimination of federal and state administrators' discre-
tion, essentially "tying their hands" by preventing the
structuring of a compliance procedure as they see fit.
As an example of the above phenomenon, in Sierra
Club v. Colo. Refining Co., 69 the State agency, respond-
ing to years of violations by the defendant, issued a No-
165. See id. at 1178-80.
166. Id. at 1181 (emphasis added).
167. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
168. Id. at 69, quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
537, 539 (1824).
169. 852 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1994).
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tice of Violation and Cease and Desist Order ("NOV"). 170
The State agency and the defendant were also in the
process of "discussing the appropriate penalties to be
assessed for [defendant's past] permit violations . .
[and] [citizen-plaintiffs] representative attended the last
[such] meeting . . . where penalty amounts were dis-
cussed."71  Additionally, for another violation of
groundwater seepage, the defendant (and Its adjacent
neighbor not named in the instant suit) entered into an
Administrative Order on Consent with the EPA.172 At the
defendant's court action requesting dismissal of the
subsequent citizen suit, the court began its analysis
using, among other things, the seminal case of Gwalt-
170. "The NOV ordered [defendant), inter alia, to cease these
violations [reflected in the NOV] and to submit a detailed statement
of the measures taken to achieve compliance with the NOV ... [ad-
ditionally,] [tlhe NOV indicated that [the State agency] had the
authority to impose penalties under the [comparable State law] for
violating the NPDES permit or the NOV." Id. at 1478 (italics
added). The court had already ruled "that the NPDES permit was
issued to [defendant] under 'comparable state law' within the
meaning of the CWA." Id. at 1484 n. 10, citing Sierra Club v. Colo.
Refining Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1436 (D. Colo. 1993).
171. Colo. Refining, 852 F. Supp. at 1478.
172. "One of the objectives of the Consent Order was to 'per-
form Interim Measures at the Facilities necessary to minimize or
eliminate any releases of hazardous waste or hazardous constitu-
ents from or at the Facilities and to mitigate or eliminate any
threats to human health or the environment from any such re-
leases . . .The Consent Order required [defendant and his neigh-
bor] to implement RCRA Facility Investigation and Corrective
Measures Study which were 'necessary to (1) fully characterize the
sources of contamination; (2) characterize the potential pathways of
contaminant migration; (3) define the degree and extent of con-
tamination: (4) identify actual or potential receptors; and (5) sup-
port the development of remediation alternatives from which cor-
rective measures will be selected by the [Federal and State] Agen-
cies' . .. The Consent Order required the [Federal and State Agen-
cies] to review and approve 'all Design Plans, Work Plans, and any
draft or final reports submitted pursuant to this Consent Order' . .
and authorized these agencies to request [defendant and his
neighbor] to perform additional work to accomplish the objectives
of the order." Id. at 1479.
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ney: "[the primary function of the provision for citizen
suits is to enable private parties to assist in enforce-
ment efforts where Federal and State Authorities appear
unwilling to act . . . It follows that 'the citizen suit
[under section 1365] is meant to supplement rather
than to supplant governmental [enforcement] action'...
. Presumably, then, when it appears that governmental
action under either the Federal or comparable State
Clean Water Acts begins and is diligently prosecuted,
the need for citizen's suits vanishes."17.3 Since the gov-
ernmental action had
[Dlevised a plan of attack of [defendant's] unper-
mitted discharges into groundwater [,] [dieference
should be given to this plan . . . [because]
[djuplicative actions aimed at exacting financial pen-
alties in the name of environmental protection at a
time when remedial measures are well under way do
not further... the goal [of restoring and maintaining
the physical and biological integrity of the nation's
waters]. 174
Thus, the plaintiffs argument to ignore the ongoing
governmental agency action was an attempt "to balkan-
ize federal and state water pollution statutes and the
agencies which give them effect." 175 The court added,
"[tihe focus of the statutory bar to citizen's suits is not
on state statutory construction, but on whether correc-
tive action already taken and diligently pursued by the
government seeks to. remedy the same violations as du-
plicative civilian action."176 Finally, regarding the plain-
tiffs argument that the only governmental actions that
would be able to preclude citizen suits are administra-
tive penalty actions, the court examined the statute
seemingly with a microscope and proved that It could
173. Id. at 1483, quoting Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61.
174. Id., citing Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555-56.
175. Colo. Refining, 852 F. Supp. at 1483.
176. Id. (emphasis added). This might be the precise definition
of the word "dispositive" used in Kodak, infra note 180.
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scrutinize statutes with the best of them: "[t]he differ-
ence in the language of [§ 1319(g)(6)(A)(i) and §
1319(g)(6)(A)(ii)] indicates that, whereas § 1319(g)(6)(A)(i)
only precludes a citizen suit where the administrator or
state Is diligently prosecuting an action for administra-
tive penalties, § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) does not contain this
limitation."177 Thus, citizen suits can be barred by a
state agency having authority to assess civil penalties
"regardless of whether the agency has actually assessed
such penalties." 178
Similarly, in Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 79 the defendant's DMRs revealed that it had
repeatedly exceeded permit limits for discharges of cer-
tain pollutants. 180 The citizen-plaintiffs filed three sepa-
rate notices of intent to sue all required parties, ulti-
mately filing its complaint approximately three months
177. Id at 1485 (emphasis added). A line of cases (albeit with
contrary results) using a similar kind of 'microscopic' statutory in-
terpretation was developed by the Ninth Circuit and discussed su-
pra notes 107-33 and accompanying text.
178. Id. (emphasis added). Thus mere authority to assess civil
penalties (i.e. "comparability") is sufficient; this approach having
the theoretical effect of essentially rewriting the title of the statute
to "Potential Administrative penalties."
179. 933 F.2d 124 (2nd Cir. 1991) ("Kodak F). This Is the first
of two such actions involving the same plaintiffs and defendants.
The second, Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 12 F.3d 353 (1994) ("Kodak I'), concerned the issue of
"whether private Ii.e. citizen] groups may bring a citizen suit pur-
suant to [33 U.S.C. § 1365] to stop the discharge of pollutants not
listed in a valid permit issued pursuant to the [CWA]". Id. at 354.
For a thoughtful article analyzing the issues presented in Kodak II,
see Joanna Bowen, Note, Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co.: The Second Circuit Affirms the NPDES Permit as
a Shield and Tries to Sink the Clean Water Act 12 PACE ENVTL. L.
REv. 269 (1994).
180. "According to [citizen-plaintiff], these reports reveal at
least twenty-seven permit violations over [the period covered in the
plaintiffs complaint], including excessive discharges of cyanide,
xylene, suspended solids, methylene chloride, lead, zinc, nickel,
silver, cadmium, dichloropropane, and chloroform." See Kodak I,
933 F.2d at 126.
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after its third notice was sent. 81 Between the plaintiffs
second and third notices of intent to sue, the State
agency and the defendant entered Into both a civil con-
sent order 182 for full settlement of all civil liabilities, and
a criminal plea agreement' 83 for release of any further
criminal liability, ultimately agreeing to pay more than
$2 million dollars in penalties and fines 8 4 In the subse-
quent citizen suit summary judgement appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit, in an extremely pithy holding, stated that
the issue was "[whether [a citizen suit] may continue in
the face of a dispositive18 5 administrative and criminal
settlement."18 6
The court began its analysis by stating that citizen
suits must be narrow in scope: "a citizen suit under the
181. The court explained, "[plaintiff] did not file its complaint
until August 11, 1989, because in exchange for additional time
during which to discuss the [plaintiffs] allegations, Idefendant]
waived any defenses that it might have had relating to [plaintiffs]
delay in commencing its action." Id. at n.2.
182. "Under the terms of that order, [defendant] agreed to pay a
penalty of $1 million ... [;] submit a report to the [State] summa-
rizing the history of its operations in Rochester; prepare and sub-
mit a management practices code in order to enhance public
awareness of the dangers associated with the facility and inform
the public of plans for responding to spills or excess releases; pay
for the costs of on-site monitoring by state employees; and submit
to a comprehensive environmental audit." Id. at 126.
183. Under the agreement, [defendant admitted to one count of
unlawful dealing in hazardous wastes and another count of failing
to notify the [State agency] of excessive releases in a timely fashion.
In addition, the company agreed to pay a fine totaling $1 million
and to provide $150,000 in support for local emergency planning
committees." Id. at 126.
184. See id.
185. According to Webster, the word "dispositive" means: "I.
archaic: having the capacity or quality of giving a tendency or in-
clination to something. 2: disposing or belonging to the disposition
or direction of something; of or belonging to disposal or control."
WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIGED 655 (3d ed. 1986). However, the precise defi-
nition remains troubling to me; see supra note 176, for what seems
to be a potentially more useful definition.
186. Kodak I, 933 F.2d at 127.
CLEAN WATER ACT
[CWA] may neither be addressed wholly to past viola-
tions nor seek to recover fines and penalties I87 that the
government has elected to forego." 188 Thus, "[a] citizen
suit must be prospective in nature and must supple-
ment, not supplant, state enforcement of the [CWA]."189
According to the court, the purpose of citizen suits is "to
stop violations of the Clean Water Act that are not chal-
lenged by appropriate state and federal authorities." 90
However, the court was concerned that if citizen suits
were allowed to proceed even though a settlement
187. But did the government "forgo" any penalty amounts? The
case background section states "[aiccording to [plaintiff], these
[DMRs] reveal at least twenty seven permit violations" Id. at 126.
CWA § 1319 (g)(2) states, "the maximum amount of any class I civil
penalty under this subparagraph shall not exceed $25,000." Id.
(emphasis added). Assuming, arguendo, that each (and thus, un-
der the statute, any) of the 27 violations were class I, the total pen-
alty would be 27 X $25,000 = $675,000, or $325,000 less that the
reported civil penalty paid to the state. Thus, it seems possible
that the government did not forego any penalties in this case. Per-
haps the defendant should have avoided the government's settle-
ment offer, and negotiated with the citizen-plaintiffs directly.
. 188. Kodak 1, 933 F.2d at 127, referring to Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at
61. Justice Marshall's 'infamous' (as viewed by some) text referred
to is: "[tihe danger [of permitting citizen suits for past violations
undermining the supplementary role envisioned by Congress] is
best illustrated by an example . . . Suppose the Administrator
agreed not to assess or otherwise seek civil penalties on the condi-
tion that the violator take some extreme corrective action . . .that
it otherwise would not be obliged to take. If citizens could file suit,
months or years later, in order to seek the civil penalties that he
Administrator chose to forego, then the Administrator's discretion
to enforce the Act in the public interest would be curtailed consid-
erably." Id. (emphasis added). It is also ironic that this 'infamous'
quote would be attributed to none other that Justice Thurgood
Marshall, the "godfather of civil rights," since "[einvironmental
movements have borrowed extensively from the tactics of the civil
rights movement." Friday Chibembudu Adikema, Casenote, Gwalt-
ney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation Inc.: Broci-
ening Citizen's Locus Standing in Environmental Suits: The Legacy of
Justice Thurgood Marshall, 20 S.U. L. REV. 69, 80 (1993)
189. Kodak I, 933 F.2d at 127, referring to Gwaltney, 484 U.S.
at 59-60.
190. Kodak I, 933 F.2d at 127.
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agreement between the government and the violator was
reached (i.e. "challenged by appropriate state and fed-
eral authorities"), this would tend to discourage the gov-
ernment from settling, thus contributing to under-
enforcement of the CWA by government.' 9' The court
held that "a citizen suit pursuant to [33 U.S.C. §
1365192] may not revisit terms of the settlement reached
by competent state authorities without regard to the
probability of the continuation of the violations alleged
in its complaint"193 remanding the case to the district to
determine whether the alleged violation was
continuing.9 4 Curiously, in the last paragraph of its
opinion, the court then allowed the citizen plaintiffs to
seek an award of expenses and attorney fees, explain-
ing, "when the polluter's settlement with state authori-
ties follows the proper commencement of a citizen suit,
one can, absent contrary evidence, infer that the exis-
tence of the citizen suit was a motive for the polluter's
settlement and that the citizen suit plaintiff is therefore
a prevailing party. " 195
While previous to, but essentially echoing Kodak, the
Eighth Circuit in EPA v. City of Green Forest96 pondered
preclusion of a citizen suit against a polluter relative to
a later filed action and consent decree by the EPA. 97
Additionally, the citizen suit had proceeded to trial and
191. See id.
192. The court here ignored the plain language of § 1365 "in a
court," discussed supra in Part III. Since this case was decided
several years after the addition of § 1319 (g), the court could have
used the administrative penalty provision as a rationale for pre-
cluding the citizen suit.
193. Kodak I, 933 F.2d at 127 (emphasis added).
194. It can be inferred that if the violation is continuing, the
citizen suit may not be precluded, but if the violation has "ceasled]
and [there has been] eliminated any realistic prospect of [violations]
recurr[ingl," then the citizen suit must be dismissed. Id. at 128.
195. Id. at 128.
196. 921 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1990).
197. Id. at 1403.
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resulted in a judgement against the polluter. 198 The
court stated "we are faced squarely with the question
whether citizen's claims brought prior to a government
action are properly dismissed when a consent decree is
entered in a later-filed EPA action."199 While the court
acknowledged that other circuits had reached a result
contrary to its holdng,200 the court opined, "[slince citi-
zens suing under the CWA are cast in the role of private
attorneys general, as a practical matter there was little
left to be done after the EPA stepped in and negotiated a
consent decree"20 1 because "the CWA was not intended
to enable citizens to commandeer the federal enforce-
ment machinery." 20 2 In response to the plaintiffs claims
about the terms of the consent, the court held, "[w]hile
the citizens might have preferred more stringent terms
than those worked out by the EPA, such citizens are no
more aggrieved than citizens who are precluded from
commencing an action in the first instance because of
pending agency action."2 3 Finally, the court held that
the low amount of penalty assessed per violation 204 by
t
198. "[Aifter a six-week trial, the jury . . . found [defendant]
guilty of 43 CWA violations . .. [later] the court assessed $43,000
against [defendant] for CWA violations." Id. at 1400. For the trial
judge's opinion assessing penalties, see Work v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
720 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
199. Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1403.
200. The court cited as examples Atlantic States Legal Found.,
Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 681 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1988)
("holding that district court had 'no discretion' to dismiss a prop-
erly filed citizen suit when a government enforcement action was
later brought covering the same claims." Green Forest, 921 F.2d at
1404) and Sierra Club v. Coca-Cola Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D.
Fla. 1987) ("consent decree entered into by the EPA and the defen-
dant did not require dismissal of the Sierra Club action for the
same CWA violations when the Sierra Club, a third party in the
case, did not consent." Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1404).
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. I& at 1402, quoting DuBois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 949
(8th Cir. 1987).
203. Id. at 1404.
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the trial court was not an abuse of discretion since "the
amount of penalty to be levied is discretionary with the
district court . . . [thus] its determination, based solely
on the good faith efforts of [the defendant] to comply
with the law [is not an abuse of discretion]. "2015
The "twist" came precisely two years (to the day) after
Kodak was decided. The Second Circuit again revisited
and refined the citizen suit preclusion issue in Atlantic
States Legal Found. v. Pan American Tanning Corp, 20 6
resulting in what seems, at first blush, to be a "circuit
split within the circuit." In Pan American, the defendant
violated the terms of a permit issued by a local (not fed-
eral or state) agency. 2 7 The local agency brought en-
forcement proceedings, with the defendant ultimately
entering into a settlement order, agreeing to pay fines
and penalties totaling $7,300208 and to accelerate its ef-
forts to Improve its pollution treatment system.209 Some
four months before the execution of the settlement or-
der, the citizen plaintiffs filed their complaint, 20 alleg-
ing, inter alia, that "[oif the 173 violations, plaintiffs
claimed that 34 had occurred since they filed the com-
plaint."211 The court first analyzed pursuant to moot-
204. The court "assess[ed] only a $1,000 fine per violation." Id.
at 1407. Additionally, the court noted that the "Jury was made
aware, through counsel's questions, that it could find more than
700 violations of the CWA if it so chose," the jury only found 43
violations. Id
205. Green Forest, 921 F.2d at 1404, quoting Atlantic States Le-
gal Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F. 2d 1128, 1142 (1 1th Cir.
1990).
206. 993 F.2d 1017 (2nd Cir. 1993).
207. Id. at 1018.
208. The amounts were: two appearance tickets where the local
court imposed a total fine of $700; settlement order execution had
an agreed penalty of $4,100; and penalties for additional violations
were $2,500. See id. at 1019.
209. See id.
210. "Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief, civil
penalties, the right to monitor [defendant's] compliance for a lim-
ited period and attorney's fees." Pan American, 993 F.2d at 1019.
211. Id. (emphasis added).
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ness doctrine, as discussed in Gwaltney,212 exactly
which portions213 of a citizen suit might be subject to
preclusion. While Kodak had "treatled] citizen suits as a
whole and requireld] dismissal of the entire suit when
there is no 'realistic prospect that violations alleged in
[the] complaint will continue,'" 214 Pan American held that
since there were ongoing violations at the time citizen-
plaintiffs filed suit, "[uinder these circumstances, civil
penalties 215 can still be imposed, though only for post-
212. "Longstanding principals of mootness . . . prevent the
maintenance of suit when 'there is no reasonable expectation that
the wrong will be repeated.' In seeking to have a case dismissed as
moot, however, the defendant's burden 'is a heavy one."' Id., quot-
ing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 66 (other citations omitted).
213. Citizen suits typically consist of requests for injunctive
and declaratory relief as well as a request for civil penalties. The
court stated that Igenerally when a plaintiff seeks both injunctive
relief and damages or penalties [i.e. civil relief], the Supreme Court
has long directed courts to analyze a mootness claim directed at
one form of relief separately from a mootness claim directed at the
other." Id. at 1020 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus fol-
lows my use of the word "portions."
214. Id. at 1021, misquoting Kodak, 933 F.2d at 127-28. What
Kodak actually said was, "Nor may the citizen suit proceed merely
for the purpose of further investigating and monitoring the state
compromise absent some realistic prospect of the alleged violations
continuing." Id. (emphasis added).
215. Here, the court infers that civil penalties may be precluded
under special circumstances. However, the court never addresses
whether injunctive relief may be precluded. Since U.S.C. § 1319
expressly states that the diligent action by a federal or state agency
in assessing administrative penalties "shall not be the subject of a
civil penalty," 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(6)(A) (1987) (emphasis added),
and never states anything about injunctive relief, it can be inferred
that injunctive relief cannot ever be precluded (see infra note 256
and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the statutory rule
regarding specific mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
others not mentioned). Case law supports this inference. See, e.g.,
Coalition for a Liveable W. Side v. N.Y. City Dep't of Envtl. Protec-
tion, 830 F. Supp 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. '1993) ("1 conclude that this
[citizen suit] action is not barred by § 1319 (g)(6) because the clear
language of that provision precludes only citizen suits seeking civil
penalties... [Since] [tIhis complaint seeks only injunctive relief...
[a]ccordingly this suit is not barred by § 1319(g)(6)."); see also N.Y.
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complaint violations 216 and for violations that were on-
going at the time plaintiffs filed suit."217 Finally, since
the agency was not federal or state, but merely a local
agency, the court noted that this agency was accorded
"less deference than [the CWA accords] those of state
and federal agencies.. . [and thus] only federal or state
civil or administrative penalty actions can preclude citi-
zen suits." 21 8
Thus, one logical concern of citizens in the face of
"broad" citizen suit preclusion, that "regulators often
[would] become too close to the industries they regu-
lated, and [may] lack[ I the aggressiveness that con-
cerned individuals would bring to the lawsuits"2 9 seems
to have been addressed in the Second Circuit. While
Kodak seemingly broadened the scope of citizen suit
preclusions, allowing preclusion for a settlement that
ostensibly was substantially similar to what could be
expected should the citizen suit prevail, Pan American
again narrowed the scope of preclusion because the re-
sult would not have been substantially similar to a suc-
cessful citizen suit.
Coastal Fishermen's Assoc. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Sanitation, 772 F.
Supp. 162, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) "Iwle note that the limitation [i.e.
preclusion] on citizen suits ... relates only to actions for civil pen-
alties, not injunctive or declaratory relief." Id. Also there exists
sparse but relevant legislative history to support this: "Mo one may
bring an action to recover civil penalties under ... 1§ 1365] of this
Act for any violation with respect to which the Administrator has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting an administrative civil
penalty action . . . this limitation would not apply to... an action
seeking relief other than civil penalties (e.g .... an injunction or
declaratory judgement)." H.R. Rep. No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
at 133 (1986), quoted in Livable W. Side, 830 F. Supp. at 196 n.1.
216. Thereby squaring its opinion with the Gwaltney "wholly
past violations" test. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64.
217. Pan American, 993 F.2d at 1021.
218. Id. at 1022, referring to N.Y. Pub. Interest Group, Inc. v.
Limco Mfg. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 608, 610-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
219. William Glaberson, Citizens' Lawsuits, Once a Useful
Weapon Against Polluters, Losing Clout FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, June 13, 1999, available in 1999 WL 6239525.
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Ill. EXPLORING THE "TWIST": STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND
BEYOND
It is in this Circuit split between the Ninth and Second
Circuits that a geemingly fertile ground for exploration
of exactly when (and how) judges should interpret a
statute exists: should judges strive to achieve a reliable
science of statutory interpretation as it applies to end-
ronmental statutes?
While many times the bulk of what judges do relates
to 'interpreting' or 'constructing' statutes, 220 there seems
no definite theory as to how to accurately and consis-
tently achieve this:
Do not expect anybody's theory of statutory inter-
pretation, whether it is your own or somebody else's,
to be an accurate statement of what courts actually
do with statutes. The hard truth of the matter Is
that American courts have no intelligible, generally
accepted, and consistently applied theory of statu-
tory interpretation. 221
This ambiguity in exactly what rules (if any) to apply
may result in 'judicial legislation', accordingly this in-
terpretation power given to judges under the Federal
Constitution comes with a caveat. Use of this power
may either underpin or undermine 222 the foundations of
220. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 114, at 14-18.
221. HENRY M. HART, JR & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS
1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994),
quoted in SCALIA, supra note 114, at 14.
222. These are both building construction terms, and since I
was previously a general contractor for almost 10 years, I feel
qualified enough not to rely on citation for this footnote: "Under-
pinning" is a process used when constructing a new building next
to an existing one where, If the existing building's footings (the
wider portion at the base of the foundation wall- analogous to one's
foot) is at a higher level, excavating for the new building below this
level may cause the building to collapse (i.e. to be "undermined").
Thus an extension (or "underpinning") of the existing footings to
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the doctrine of Separation of Powers 22, depending on the
care exerted by the judiciary, because if a judge inter-
prets or constructs a statute unnecessarily, he tends to
usurp the power of the legislative branch.24 Thus, in its
essence the question is, when should judges "interpret"
and/or "construct"225 a statute and when should judges
the same level of the new building's footing is necessary for safety
reasons, or, to prevent "undermining."
223. "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself .... We see
it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of
power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several
offices [i.e. the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches] in
such a manner as that each may be a check on the other- that the
private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the pub-
lic rights." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (James Madison).
224. "The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over ei-
ther the sword [i.e. the Executive] or the purse [i.e. the Legislature];
no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society;
and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to
have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgement; and must
ultimately depend on the aid of the executive arm even for the effi-
cacy of its judgement." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander
Hamilton).
225. Interestingly, there is even disagreement between the
"classic" treatises on whether the acts of "interpretation" and "con-
struction" are interchangeable, or whether they are completely dif-
ferent concepts. Black, in his "classic" treatise on statutory con-
struction, under the chapter entitled "Definition of Terms," states,
"there is a substantial difference between interpretation and con-
struction as methods for the exegesis [i.e. the exposition, critical
analysis, or interpretation of a word or literary passage] of written
laws. In strictness, interpretation is limited to exploring the writ-
ten text, while construction goes beyond and may call in the aid of
extrinsic considerations .... Interpretation ... is the art of finding
out the true sense of any form of words . . . [in] the sense which
their author intended to convey ... [while c]onstruction . . . is the
drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the di-
rect expressions of the text, from elements known from and given
in the text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within
the letter, of the text." HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE
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decline to do so, the ultimate goal being not to violate
the doctrine of Separation of Powers. Should this be
discretionary with the Judge (essentially ad hoc) or
should there be a clear set of rules as to when statutory
interpretation should "kick in"?
This question has intrigued legal thinkers both here
and abroad for many years. 226 Some 400 years ago in
England, Lord. Coke provided a foundation for a phi-
losophy favoring legislative supremacy in interpreting
statutes:
[F]or the full and true interpretation of all statutes in
general . . . four things are to be considered - 1".
What was the common law before the making of the
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 3 (West Publishing
Co., 2d ed. 1911), citing LIEBER, HERMENEUTICS, 11 (1839). How-
ever, Sutherland, as revised by Professor Singer, in his "updated
classic" treatise summarizes Black's (and thus Lieber's) observa-
tions on the distinction between interpretation and construction,
then states, "[tihis distinction is not helpful. It is generated from
the obsolete idea that words 'mean' something in themselves In
fact it has been held that judicial behavior in resolving statutory
issues does not differ according to whether it is characterized as
construction of interpretation. . . [therefore, iun this work, the
terms 'interpretation' and 'construction' are used interchangeably."
2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.03, at
21 (Norman J. Singer editor, 5th ed. 1992) (1891) (emphasis
added), citing, inter alia LIEBER, HERMENEUTICS, 11 (1839), reprinted
in HART, 5 CLASSICS IN LEGAL HISTORY REPRINT SERIES (Marshy & Ja-
cobstein eds. 1970); Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7
COLUM. L. REV. 379 (1907); and OGDEN & RICHARDS, THE MEANING
OF MEANING 12 (1936) (other citations omitted). While I, in theory,
am attracted to the "classical" point of view that interpretation and
construction have different roles to play in statutory interpretation,
in my humble opinion I nevertheless agree with Sutherland that,
truly nowadays, words have no meaning (as an Illustration of this
consider the evolution of the word "bad." Perhaps 25 years ago, if I
said a musical group was "bad" I meant that they did not play well,
were discordant, etc. However, nowadays, if I say a musical group
is "bad" I most probably mean that they were "really good." If I want
to communicate that the group is the opposite of good, I may say,
"they stink" (not referring to their personal hygiene, but whether
their music appeals to me).
226. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
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act? 2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which
the common law did not provide? 3rd. What remedy
the [government] hath resolved and appointed to
cure the disease of the [community]? And 4th. The
true reason for the remedy.227
Because of the magnitude of responsibility assigned to
judges in this area, it is important to "recognize the ne-
cessity of care in the consideration of any means of ex-
planation outside of the statute itself, because of the
possibility of error in the broad field in which judgment
must operate." 228 Typically in an area that so directly
and forcefully affects the functioning of our society, we
enact certain unambiguous (or as near to unambiguous
as possible) rules 229 or canons to ensure that both a
consistency is achieved and that all come to understand
exactly .what is required of them. It follows that a "sub-
ject so important as the . . . interpretation of the laws
[should not] be left to the mere arbitrary discretion of
the judiciary. This would be to put in their hands power
really superior to that of the Legislature itself."2 3o
227. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584), cited in Suther-
land, supra note 225, at 22.
228. FRANCIS J. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: A
STATEMENT AND EXPOSITION OF THE GENERAL RULES OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 2 (1953).
229. However, Professor Sedgwick, in his treatise criticizes reli-
ance upon rules for statutory construction stating, "[wihat is re-
quired in this department [i.e. rules or no rules for statutory con-
struction] of our science is not formal rules or nice terminology, or
ingenious classification; but that through intellectual training, that
complete education of the mind, which lead to a correct result,
wholly independent of rules, and, indeed, almost unconscious of
the process by which the end is attained." SEDGWICK, CONSTRUCTION
OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 192 (2nd ed.). This ap-
proach seems to miss a critical point: how many judges possess the
required "intellectual training"? This ignores the reality that many
judges may be appointed for reasons other than their "intellectual
training" or their "unconscious . . . process[es]."
230. McCaffrey, supra note 228, at 3.
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The Supreme Court has traditionally "held that the
Constitution does not require a 'hermetic division'2.31 of
all the branches, and that some crossover for conven-
ience and efficiency is both inevitable and permissible..
[thus] absolute separation is not required [; howeverj
substantial separation is."232 The next step of the analy-
sis is determining whether "substantial separation" may
include the judiciary interpreting, or even re-writing
statutes more or less whenever it desires to. Interest-
ingly, it was Justice Blackmun who put this determina-
tion quite succinctly, "we have not hesitated to strike
down provisions of law that... undermine the authority
231. For example, in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989), Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority opinion stated,
"the Framers did not require - and indeed rejected - the notion
that the three Branches must be entirely separate and Idistinct].
Separation of powers, IMadison] wrote, 'd[oesl not mean that these
Ithree] departments ought to have no partial agency In, or no con-
troul over the acts of each other', but rather 'that where the whole
power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution are subverted."' Id. at 380, quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (emphasis in original).
Judge Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade, further illustrated
this "flexible approach" by using a quote from Buckley v. Valeo:
"the greatest security against tyranny - the accumulation of exces-
sive authority in a single branch - lies not in a hermetic division
between the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked
and balanced power within each branch." 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
However, this "flexible system" may prove for our use to be so
"flexible" as to be almost useless. For guidance, we might turn to
Justice Scalia's dissent in Mistretta for a more useful approach:
"the regrettable tendency of our recent separation-of-powers juris-
prudence [is] to treat the Constitution as though it were no more
than a generalized prescription that the functions of the Branches
should not be commingled too much - how much is too much to be
determined, case-by-case, by this Court. The Constitution is not
that. Rather, [it] is a prescribed structure, a framework, for the
conduct of government." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 426.
232. Charles S. Abell, Note, Ignoring the Trees for the Forests:
How the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates the
Constitution's Separation of Powers Principle, 81 VA. L. REV. 1957,
1965 (1995), citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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and independence of one or another coordinate
branch."2 , Further,
[Sitatute law is the will of the legislature; and the
object of all judicial interpretation of it is to deter-
mine what intention is conveyed, either expressly or
by implication, by the language used . . . [tihe wis-
dom, policy, or expediency of legislation is a matter
with which the courts have nothing whatever to do 23 4
This directs us to the rule that, only in certain cir-
cumstances where the intent of the legislature is not
reasonably obvious or inferable, is the judiciary within
the scope of their powers to perform an analysis that
attempts to extract the meaning from the text of the
statute.235
233. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382 (Blackmun, J.) (emphasis
added).
234. BLACK, supra note 225, citing MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION 1
(emphasis added).
235. As an example of this, consider the following: Mom sends
her two children Dick and Jane to the dell. In scenario 1, Mom
merely says "go to the dell and buy some food." In scenario 2, Mom
says "go to the dell and buy some milk and something for break-
fast." In scenario 3, Mom says, "go to the dell and buy milk, eggs,
sugar, and bread." In scenario 4, Mom says "go to the dell and buy
a refrigerator." Dick and Jane, in scenario 1, would need first to
realize that "food" is too large a category, and also the practical re-
ality that they were given a finite quantity of money with which to
buy food. Thus Dick and Jane might begin by thinking what has
Mom bought in the past (i.e. "legislative history"), has Mom said
that bread is almost gone (i.e. "legislative statements"), etc, to try to
determine Mom's intent. In scenario 2, Dick and Jane must buy
some milk (the quantity could be based on what Mom usually
buys), and something else limited to a typical breakfast food, say
eggs (i.e. plain or literal meaning of the words 'breakfast food'). If
Dick and Jane come back with ice cream, they probably have
usurped (thus undermining) Mom's directions (hence her powerj
because ice cream (in my example here) isn't a typical breakfast
food. In scenario 3, Dick and Jane have been given fairly unambi-
guous instructions, and had better come back with milk, eggs,
sugar and bread; the quantities would probably be based on what
Mom usually buys (an inference of intent). In scenario 4, Dick and
Jane are faced with an absurdity- they cannot buy a refrigerator at
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As discussed in Part I.C. of this Note, an action falling
within 33 U.S.C. § 1319 may successfully preclude an
action brought pursuant to 33 U.S.C § 1365, the citizen
suit provision of the CWA. Unfortunately, the various
circuits have not agreed as to a definite area that is
unanimously within the statute, leading to a premise
that some courts have correctly interpreted the intent of
the statute, and some have not. 2 6 The question is what
standard should be used to determine who is correct
(and In agreement with the Separation of Powers doc-
trine) and who is not. As an example of the cases, I
propose to consider whether Kodak237 is within the stat-
ute. Essentially, the facts in Kodak state that the citi-
zen group filed its complaint to sue in August 1989, the
DEC and the defendant entered into a civil consent or-
der, criminal fee agreement, agreed to pay a penalty of
$1,000,000, and agreed to pay a fine of $1,000,000 in
April 1990; some 8 months later. 2 8 The court held that
this was sufficient to preclude a properly brought citizen
suit.2.3 9
Since statutes are created by the legislature to govern
the general public, it follows that the general public
would be expected to understand, without translation,
from the writing itself what Is expected of them. For the
general public to understand the words, they must be
constructed in accordance with the public's meaning of
the local deli. Thus, depending on their perception of Mom's pur-
pose they could attempt to "construct" what Mom really wants, or
they could just return home empty handed and tell Mom that re-
frigerators were not available today. However, Mom would proba-
bly not appreciate this response, since some sort of logical "con-
struction" would be more appropriate.
236. See Bowen, supra note 179, at 300.
237. 933 F.2d 124 (2nd cir. 1991); see supra notes 179-95 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the facts of this case.
238. 933 F.2d at 126.
239. See id. at 127.
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words. 240 This means that these words must have a lit-
eral meaning:
The doctrine of literalness is fundamental to both the
writing and interpretation of statutes. Every statute
has a literal meaning, unless it has no meaning that
makes sense. The literal meaning is that which the
words express, taking them in their natural and or-
dinary sense; that is, giving to words of common use
their commonly accepted meaning and to technical
words their proper technical connotation. 241
The dictionary is regarded as a repository of the com-
mon meanings of words; thus unless the statute specifi-
cally defines otherwise, reference to it will be liberal in
determining the meanings of various words in the CWA.
First, in section 1319 subsection (B), the statute
clearly states that the limitations (or preclusions) in this
part will not apply if either a notice to sue or a civil ac-
tion has been filed by a citizen group before commence-
ment of the Administrative penalty action. 242 In Kodak,
240. While I previously have agreed with and argued that words
have no meaning, I intend this in a more overall sense of significant
amounts of time and thus ultimately have no meaning. Essentially
my argument is that words may potentially transform their mean-
ing over the passage of time. However, in the case of statutes that
also are enacted, discarded, or modified and directly reflect people's
value systems, it still may be postulated that words in a statute
have a meaning here and now and that we can use the current
meanings of words in our analysis of the statute.
241. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 228, at 3-4.
242. "The limitations contained in subparagraph (A) ["Limita-
tion on actions under other sections," referring to, inter alla, sec-
tion 13651 on civil penalty actions under section 1365 of this title
["Citizen suits"] shall not apply with respect to any violation for
which - - (I) a civil action under section 1365 (a)(1) ["Authorization,
jurisdiction"] of this title has been filed prior to commencement of
an action under this subsection, or (ii) notice of the alleged viola-
tion of section 1365 (a)(1) of this title has been given in accordance
with section 1365 (b)(1)(A) of this title ["Notice"] prior to com-
mencement of an action under this subsection and an action under
section 1365 (a)(1) of this title with respect to such alleged violation
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the citizen group had sent one notice to sue243 and filed
one citizen suit action 244 before the Administrative pen-
alty action arose. 245 Unmistakably, the citizen group
action preceded any administrative action noted by the
court and thus, in accordance with the plain meaning of
the statute, the citizen suit should not have been pre-
cluded.
Second, the title of the subsection is not "Penalties,"
but "Administrative penalties," thus specifically men-
tioning exactly one kind of penalty to the exclusion of
any other penalties. The adverb "Administrative" is de-
fined as "pertaining to administration;" 246 the suffix "-
tion" is defined as "something [administer]ed." 247 Addi-
tionally, it is an Administrator "who administers, or who
executes, directs, manages, distributes, or dispenses, as
in . . . civil . . . affairs."248 Since the CWA defines the
Administrator of the EPA as the entity to administer all
parts of the CWA,249 the only kind of operative penalty
that this subsection applies to is one issued by the Ad-
ministrator. Additionally, the statute mandates through
its use of the present Indicative of the word "have" (in
is filed before the 1200' day after the date in which the notice is
given." 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(6)(B) (1987).
243. "On April 17 1989, [the citizen group] informed [defen-
dant], [and the state and federal administrators] that it intended to
sue [defendant] for violating the terms of its regulatory permit."
Kodak, 933 F.2d at 125.
244. "[Citizen group] . . . file[d] its complaint [6n] August 11,
1989." Id. at 126 n.2.
245. Kodak states "on April 5, 1990, after several months of
private negotiations, Kodak and the DEC entered into [civil con-
sent, criminal plea agreement, a penalty agreement, and a fine
agreement]." Id. at 126.
246. WEBSTEReS DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 25 (2d ed. 1979)
(emphasis added).
247. Id. at 1913.
248. Id. at 25.
249. "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter,
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (herein-
after in this chapter called 'Administrator') shall administer this
chapter." 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (d) (1987).
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"has paid a penalty assessed under this subsection"20)
that the penalty must be paid before the citizen suit
arises to enable the administrative penalty to preclude
the citizen suit.251 In Kodak, the court reported that
"[the defendant] agreed to pay a penalty of $1 million..
. [also] the company agreed to pay a fine totaling $1
million."2 2 As stated above, the only type of adminis-
trative action is a penalty action, thus this eliminates
the administrative fine action as enabling preclusion of
the citizen suit. Moreover, the facts of the case make it
obvious that the penalty was merely agreed, and to be
actually paid at a much later date after the citizen suit
arose, so the penalty agreement timing is contrary to the
plain meaning of the statute. Thus, the penalty agree-
ment cannot successfully preclude the citizen suit.
Third, section 1319(g), titled "Administrative penalties"
expressly specifies two classes 253 of penalties: Class 1,254
which has a maximum of 25,000 for any penalty, and
Class 11255 that has a maximum of $125,000 for (again)
any penalty. The statute does not specify any other
classes of penalties. "It is a general rule of statutory
250. 33 U.S.C § 1319 (g)(6)(A) (1987).
251. See Part II. 1, specifically Knee Deep, supra notes 157-63
and accompanying text for the Ninth Circuit's analysis of this con-
cept.
252. Kodak, 933 F.2d at 126 (emphasis added).
253. "[The Administrator or Secretary . . . may . . . assess a
class I civil penalty or a class II civil penalty under this subsec-
tion." 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(1) (1987) (emphasis added). Note the
use of the word "may" and not "shall." This infers that the imposi-
tion of this Administrative penalty is discretionary with the Admin-
istrator.
254. "The amount of a class I civil penalty under paragraph (1)
may not exceed $10,000 per violation, except that the maximum
amount of any class I civil penalty under this subparagraph shall
not exceed $25,000." 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g}(2)(A).
255. "The amount of a class II civil penalty under paragraph (1)
may not exceed $10,000 per day for each day during which the
violation continues; except that the maximum amount of any class
II civil penalty under this subparagraph shall not exceed
$125,000." 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(2)(B).
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construction that expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
That is to say, the specific mention of one person or
thing implies the exclusion of other persons or
things."25 6 Thus, it may be held that outside of these
maximum penalty amounts Is not within the statute,
hence unable to preclude an otherwise properly brought
citizen suit.
Section 1319 subsection (2), "Classes of penalties" has
some ambiguity that may bear directly upon whether a
case is, In terms of 'classical' statutory interpretation,
rightly or erroneously decided. The statute reads that a
penalty for a violation may not exceed a certain amount
($10,000 per violation or per day) except that the maxi-
mum amount of any of the 2 classes of civil penalties
may not exceed a certain amount ($25,000 or
$125,000).257 Are the "maximum amount[s]" in the stat-
ute (e.g. "shall not exceed $25,000" or "shall not exceed
$125,000") a total or are they sub-totals for each pen-
alty? Essentially the question is, does the word "any"
mean "all" in this statute? This Is tricky because the
preceding sentence refers to an amount per violation or
amount per day and one would expect the next part of
the logic to mandate a total. According to Webster, the
word "any" means "1. one (no matter which) of more
than two ... 2. some (no matter how much, how many,
or what kind) . . . 4. Every."258 "Every" can also mean
"all" and seems to logically fit into the context of the
subsection as a whole, where the words "one" and
"some" when substituted in the statute in lieu of the
word "ary" seem to render the logic of the statute ab-
surd. Thus, it can be concluded that the maximum
amount for all Class I administrative penalties to enable
a citizen suit preclusion is $25,000, and for Class II
penalties $125,000. Kodak's penalty amount exceeded
256. MCCAFFREY, supra note 228, at 50-51, citing Wallace v.
Swinton, 64 N.Y. 188 (1876).
257. 3:3 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(2) (1987).
258. WEBSTER, supra note 185, at 83 (emphasis added).
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the statutory limit, thus disallowing preclusion of the
citizen suit.259 Conversely, even if the word "any" is in-
terpreted to mean "each," the facts stated that there
were 27 violations. Assuming each violation was Class
I, 27 X $25,000 (maximum) = a maximum of $675,000;
still lower than the reported penalty paid of 1 million
dollars. 260 Again, according the rationale above, the citi-
zen suit should not have been precluded.
Thus, it is evident that, pursuant to 'classical' statu-
tory construction (which the Ninth Circuit has so con-
sistently illustrated) that Kodak was improperly decided.
This would be the end of the matter if it were not for two
seemingly small points: (1) Following Kodak, the Second
Circuit should have followed its own precedent and al-
lowed citizen suit preclusion in the subsequent case of
Pan American Tanning Corp,261 an atrocious case that
demonstrated the Second Circuit's excellent jurispru-
dence by completely ignoring its own holding in Kodak
and denying citizen suit preclusion for a somewhat
similar set of facts; and (2) the fact that one million dol-
lars was paid as a penalty in Kodak.
The sum of one million dollars seems in some way (to
me anyway), a magical number, especially when one
pauses to realize that the executives of Kodak had to
account to their Board of Director for this penalty
amount. It can be surmised that someone at Kodak had
a lot of explaining to do since the stockholder's profits
were down, and also that someone's job was on the line
if this ever happened again. 262  Thus, the penalty
amount may have achieved its intended purpose, cor-
259. In Kodak more then $1,000,000 was paid. Kodak, 933
F.2d at 126.
260. See supra note 187 for the facts regarding amount of vio-
lations.
261. 933 F.2d 1017 (2nd Cir. 1993). For an analysis of the
facts in this case see supra notes 206-19 and accompanying text.
262. Based on my understanding of basic business principles, a
$1,000,000 penalty will cause shareholders to, least of all, demand
an explanation if not action.
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rect statutory interpretation or not, by ensuring that
one more company will not pollute again. While this
intent may be a purely economic purpose, and ostensi-
bly contrary to Deep Ecology's moral revulsion of pollu-
tion, the result in the short run may be the same: the
restoration and maintenance of chemical, physical and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters. This is the
essential paradox that makes the study of Law so fasci-
nating.
IV. RES JUDICATA; OR, WHAT HAPPENS SHOULD THE CITIZEN
SUIT PROCEED?
While the above text attempts to analyze cases where
the issue is to "preclude or not to preclude" the citizen
suit, with the exception of Chesapeake Bay Found. v.
American Recovery Co.,26,  none of these cases shed any
light on how the court should structure the ensuing liti-
gation should the citizen suit not be precluded. A very
recent case provides some interesting analysis as to how
the court should proceed in this situation. In Old
Timer,264 Inc. v. Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation, 265 the
defendant violated the effluent limitations of his permit,
and received in response a Notice of Violation and Cease
and Desist Order ("NOV/CDO") from the state agency.266
Some four months after the NOV was issued, the plain-
tiff filed suit pursuant to section 1365(b).267  Three
months subsequent to the citizen suit filing, the state
and the defendant executed a Civil Penalty Order
agreement requiring the defendant to pay a civil penalty
263. 769 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1985). See supra note 45, for rele-
vant text supporting available means a court has to protect defen-
dants from duplicative litigation.
264. "The Old Timer Is a tourist attraction offering the opportu-
nity to pan for gold in North Clear Creek." Old Timer, 51 F. Supp.
2d 1109 (D. Colo. 1999).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1111.
267. See id.
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of $85,000.268 In the consolidated motions to dismiss
and summary judgment, the court reviewed the circuit
split269 regarding the citizen suit preclusion for "Admin-
istrative penalties" pursuant to section 1319(g), and
concluded 2 0 that "[blecause the [state agency] had not
yet commenced an action for administrative penalties or
assessed such penalties before [defendant] filed its suit,
§ 1319(g)(6) does not preclude this citizen action."271
The court then considered separately whether injunc-
tive relief and civil penalties were mooted272 by the sub-
sequent events in the case. In terms of injunctive relief,
it said "[a] claim for injunctive relief becomes moot when
there is no reasonable expectation that the polluter will
continue to pollute in the future . .. I conclude, there-
fore, that [citizen-plaintiffs] claim for injunctive relief is
moot because the [defendant] has shown it is now in
268. See id. at 1110.
269. The court stated, "[bjefore the [plaintiff] commenced its
suit, the only action Initiated by the [state agency) was the issu-
ance of a compliance order to the [defendant]. Case law Is split on
whether this is sufficient to preclude a citizen suit under § 1319
(g)(6)(A)(ii)." Id. at 1110, comparing UNOCAL, 83 F.3d at 1118:
Washington PIRG, 11 F.3d at 883; Friends of Santa Fe County v.
LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1347 (D. N.M. 1995); Molo-
kai Chamber of Commerce v. KuKui Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1389, 1403-
05 (D. Haw. 1995); and Pub. Interest Research Group, 822 F. Supp.
at 184; with Scituate, 949 F.2d at 555-57; Colo. Refining, 852 F.
Supp. at 1484-85; and N.Y. Coastal Fisherman's Assoc, 772 F.
Supp. at 165.
270. For the complete analysis of what factors the court used to
reach its conclusion, see Old Timer, supra note 264, at 1115-16.
271. Id. at 1115.
272. The court stated, "[mlootness is a jurisdictional question
derived from Article III of the United States Constitution, which
restricts the exercise of judicial power to instances where a 'case or
controversy' exists." Id. at 1116. The relevant text of the Consti-
tution states, "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States ... to Controversies between two or more States;-- between
a State and Citizens of another State;-- [and] between Citizens of
different States." U.S. Const. art Ill, § 2, cl. 2.
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compliance and that its permanent improvements 273
make it unlikely that the discharge violations at issue in
this case will continue." 274 However, the court con-
cluded differently for the civil penalty claim:
Citizens file actions [under the CWA] primarily to
deter future violations by the named defendant and
other potential polluters and the imposition of pen-
alties significantly enhances the deterrent effect of a
citizen suit . . .the requested civil penalties do not
simply provide [defendant] 'psychic satisfaction' by
vindicating an 'undifferentiated public interest' in
enforcing the law, [therefore] the claim is not
moot.
275
Thus, the request for civil penalties by the citizen-
plaintiff so far had "survived" preclusion and mootness
"attacks." In analyzing civil penalty survival pursuant
to the doctrine of Res Judicata, however, the court
found that the State's Civil Penalty Order assessed pen-
alties for many of the same violations at issue in the
case. 276 Since "a state and its private citizens are In
privity when the state, acting as parens patriae, brings
an action for damage to a public resource . . . res judi-
cata bars... those violations covered by the [Civil Pen-
alty Order]."277 Thus, only new violations after the Civil
Penalty Order, or other violations not addressed by the
Order could be maintained.
273. During the trial, apparently the defendant provided suffi-
cient evidence of treatment plant upgrades to lead the court to con-
clude that these had already corrected the problem underlying de-
fendant's permit violations.
274. Old Timer, supra note 264, at 1116, referring to Gwaltney,
484 U.S. ;at 66.
275. I'd. at 1117, quoting Natural Resources Defense Council,'
Inc. v. Texaco Ref. & Mfg. Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 503 n.9 (3rd Cir. 1993).
276. Id. at 1118.
277,. Old Timer, supra note 264, at 1118, referring to Satsky v.
Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993)
(italics added).
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Interestingly, the ultimate result in this case is quite
similar to the result achieved in two cases that have
been subjected to tremendous criticism by the legal
community: Gwaltney ("[plermitting citizen suits for
wholly past violations of the Act could undermine the
supplementary role envisioned for the citizen suit."278)
and Kodak ("wle hold that a citizen suit cannot proceed
solely for the purpose of challenging the terms of a set-
tlement reached by state officials so long as the settle-
ment reasonably assures that the violations alleged in
the citizen suit have ceased and will not recur."279)
CONCLUSION
There is a concern among environmentalists recently
that the scope of citizen suit preclusion is becoming
broader, thus it is becoming "harder and harder for...
citizen suits to get into court. '" 2 0 The specific concern is
that the citizen suit "standing" has been made stricter,
because "Itlhe courts have gradually increased the legal
tests for when such [citizen] suits are permitted, often
relying on a requirement ... [that] has long been inter-
preted as giving people legal standing to bring suits only
when a plaintiff has a stake in a real dispute."2 '
278. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. Of course, the subsequent
history and ultimate result of Gwaltney is quite complicated, be-
cause the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Ap-
peals, (Gwaltney 11, 844 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1988)), who remanded
the case back to the District Court (Gwaltney III, 688 F. Supp.
1078 (Dist. Ct. Va. 1988). The defendant subsequently appealed
the District Court's holding (Gwaltney IV, 890 F.2d 690 (4th Cir.
1989).
279. Kodak, 933 F.2d at 125. See supra notes 179-95 for rele-
vant text and background of the case.
280. William Glaberson, Citizens' Lawsuits, Once a Useful
Weapon Against Polluters, Losing Clout, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, June 13, 1999, available in 1999 WL 6239525, quoting
John D. Escheverria, director of the Environmental Policy Project at
Georgetown University Law Center.
281. Id. For a very brief discussion on standing, see supra
note 7.
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On March 1, 1999, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to a case that will bring this issue of
standing to the court's analysis: Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services. 282 Citizen suits are ripe
for analysis by the Supreme Court, because of the nu-
merous unresolved issues, circuit splits, and lack of any
significant cases giving direction about where the law
should go since the 1987 decision in Gwaltney. Hope-
fully, the: Supreme Court will attempt to resolve the in-
consistent holdings in the circuits and preserve this im-
portant protection for our natural resource.
282. 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct.
1111 (1999).
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